R2P to Syria Explained 2011-19

The Syrian civil war of 2011 emerged as a consequence of a series of liberal protests across the Arab regions, initially aspiring for democratic development and the spread of liberal values within their governments. However, these protests escalated into a prolonged and devastating conflict, resulting in the rise of proscribed terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The conflict drew support from state actors such as Russia and the US, as well as leaders of European states and Canada, aligning themselves with opposing fighting groups – the Syrian rebels, including the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Kurdish Liberation Army, and the government of Bashar al-Assad, which has been militarily supported by Russia since 2014.

Over the years, the United Nations Security Council engaged in multiple consensus processes to determine the possibility of issuing a resolution involving the use of military forces. However, these efforts failed to produce a multilateral decision in favour of peace. This essay aims to analyze the Security Council’s inability to produce robust resolutions or enact military intervention. It seeks to uncover the key elements behind the lack of military intervention for Syria, particularly in the context of changes in the new millennium, such as the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and the involvement of certain P5 members in the Syrian war. The analysis also intends to understand the reasons why Russia, followed by China, vetoed Security Council resolutions.

This analysis takes into account the fragmentation of Syrian politics and the challenges faced by the warring parties as the primary obstacles to international assistance and intervention under the umbrella of R2P. Additionally, it considers the ideological differences among the UN P-5 members. It concludes that the R2P does not serve as a decision-making engine but rather redefines state sovereignty and human rights as tools available to those who are committed to embracing these values.

Failed UN Security Council Resolutions and the Escalation of the Syrian Civil War

On October 4th, 2011, seven months into the violent conflict in Syria, the United Nations Security Council initiated a consensus debate to authorize a robust resolution. The initial proposal aimed to urge the Assad regime to cease using force against its population, but it was met with a veto from Russia and China. Russia objected to the accusatory approach towards Damascus, while China cited concerns about foreign state sovereignty interference. This marked the first of fourteen unsuccessful attempts to establish a robust military consensus under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine between 2011 and 2019. The repeated blockades led to the exacerbation of the Syrian civil war, resulting in mass displacement and approximately 500,000 casualties, making it one of the longest and deadliest conflicts in recent history.

The recurring failure to secure UN resolutions for military intervention in Syria highlights a critical dilemma faced by the international community, emphasizing the challenges of normative principles and the value of humanitarian protection within the evolving landscape of the twenty-first century. Despite the growing awareness of human rights, particularly in response to humanitarian crises in the 1990s, such as the events in Rwanda (1994) and Somalia (1995), the UN’s ability to address such conflicts was overshadowed by the shifting dynamics of international society. This culminated in the emergence of a new approach to international military intervention within the new century, known as “The Responsibility to Protect” from 2001 to 2004.

Weaknesses of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine

This dissertation critically explores the limitations of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as the latest iteration of humanitarian military intervention. It argues that R2P, while claiming to address the challenges of past interventions, remains entrenched in the same legal and political complexities that have historically surrounded foreign military intervention.

The R2P operates within the existing international legal framework established since 1945, necessitating the creation of exceptional circumstances to justify intervention and protect state sovereignty. Despite its intent to bring about significant changes, the R2P does not fundamentally alter the legality of intervention, rendering it susceptible to politicization. Nevertheless, the R2P serves as a guiding principle for evaluating the use of military force to halt human rights violations.

Doctrine of Intervention: An Analytical Framework

This essay categorizes the R2P as a ‘doctrine’ of intervention and is structured into two parts. The first part consists of two chapters. The first chapter delves into whether the R2P represents the latest version of military intervention, while the second chapter examines the current challenges faced by the doctrine.

The second part also comprises two chapters. The third chapter focuses on the consensus for authorizing robust resolutions for Syria from the onset of the war in 2011 to 2019. It seeks to understand the factors enabling Security Council Permanent Members, specifically China and Russia, to wield veto power and the reasons behind Russia’s principled use of the veto.

Dimensions and Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The R2P, initially defined by the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, has been adopted by UN mechanisms for violence prevention and civilian protection. It is structured around three pillars: ‘the responsibility to prevent’, ‘the responsibility to protect’, and ‘the responsibility to rebuild’, encompassing preventive and reactive measures, along with post-military operation assistance.

Since its inception in 2001, the R2P has sought to revolutionize the interpretation of sovereignty concerning human rights. It emphasizes the responsibility of governments to protect their populations, aligning sovereignty with the rights and well-being of individuals. However, the R2P has also highlighted the dilemma of sovereignty within the existing international legal framework, wherein the robust dimension of R2P is considered in the context of the evolution of military intervention.

The evolution of military intervention, from the nineteenth century to the present, reflects changes in the global approach to humanitarian purposes. While foreign military interventions saw liberal approaches in the twentieth century, the R2P is perceived as imposing greater restrictions on state initiatives for military intervention targeting government forces, as evidenced by events such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. The R2P has continued to influence Security Council dynamics, particularly in the aftermath of interventions such as Libya in 2011, contributing to the use of veto power for robust resolutions.

This comprehensive analysis aims to shed light on the complexities and implications of the R2P within the context of evolving international norms and practices related to military intervention and sovereignty.

Analysis of R2P Functionality and Military Intervention

The analysis highlights the primary functionality of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as facilitating a platform for debate and potentially influencing decision-makers within the UN directorate to align with military intervention. Its effectiveness is contingent upon situations necessitating immediate urgent responses, targeting identifiable militancy, and supported by substantial evidence of crimes against humanity.

While well-intentioned, the R2P could inadvertently delay discussions and divert attention from military intervention, potentially allowing room for other peacekeeping instruments with less defined time frames, such as UN Peacekeeping Operations. However, it is crucial to consider the specific characteristics of the conflict to draw conclusions on applying military intervention as the solution to crimes against humanity.

The nuances of each situation must be carefully weighed to determine the most appropriate course of action in addressing crimes against humanity.

Part I 

The Evolution of International Intervention and the Challenges of R2P

The analysis of the origins and evolution of military intervention is crucial in understanding the reasons behind the failure of the UNSC to approve military intervention in Syria. International intervention has historically been a contentious issue, often considered illegal but legitimized by the international community and civil society.

Section 1 will delve into the inherent characteristics of international intervention mirrored in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. It will also explore the challenges that R2P encounters in the new millennium.

The analysis reveals that R2P represents a robust dimension of multilateral international intervention, contributing to ongoing debates about traditional interpretations of state sovereignty and human rights. However, it is important to note that the legality of such intervention hinges on the unanimous agreement of the Security Council’s permanent members on a resolution. Despite this, there has been no observable change in the international legal system.

Legitimacy of International Intervention

While international intervention is generally considered illegal according to the U.N. Charter and international covenants, there are instances where it is deemed legitimate, particularly when there is an imminent need to protect populations from severe human rights abuses. This legitimacy is often supported by civil society and the international community, whose moral and ethical standards demand action in the face of human rights violations.

The text also argues that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has emerged as a response to the changing socio-political landscape, influenced by events such as the ethnic cleansing of the 1990s and the shift towards a new world order following the liberalization at the end of the Cold War (1989-90) into the new millennium.

Chapter 1.  The Transformation of Military Intervention: R2P

Transformation of Military Intervention

Intervention is a traditional practice in International Relations that involves the use of military force in foreign territories due to historical and political shifts. Initially, it aimed to protect human lives and uphold power balance, prompting the need for decisions on military resource utilization. The concept of military intervention raises questions about who holds the authority to intervene and the underlying motives. This examination will explore the evolution of military intervention, particularly the emergence of humanitarian military intervention leading to the development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

The ICISS R2P Report of 2001 aimed to align the concepts of state sovereignty with human rights. Before the R2P, the justifications for the use of force were rooted in the morality of war and the Christian-based theology of the Just War Theory. However, the framework for human protection has remained unchanged since the end of World War 2. The current system is fundamentally reliant on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two covenants from 1948, the four Geneva Conventions, and two treaties prohibiting torture and genocide 1948-49. These are the primary international laws supporting military intervention for humanitarian protection, along with the political challenges that the R2P must address.

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Understanding International Military Intervention

International military intervention involves the unauthorized use of military force in foreign states with the objective of preventing or halting harmful activities perpetrated by a state’s leadership against its populace. This form of intervention is typically considered unlawful aggression, constituting a departure from conventional patterns of international relations (Murnion, 2007).

Historically, intervention was grounded in moral deliberations about the justifiability of war and was rooted in the principles of the Just War Theory. However, with the ascendance of human rights advocacy and evolving interpretations of state sovereignty, international intervention, while illegal in international law, has garnered acceptance as a legitimate measure to prevent or address human rights abuses or atrocities. This shift reflects a transformation in the understanding of intervention, acknowledging the moral imperative to protect populations from severe harm, despite its contravention of traditional international legal frameworks.

Chapter 2: Challenges and Controversies Surrounding the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The second chapter delves into the challenges and controversies that encapsulate the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. As the latest iteration of humanitarian military intervention, R2P purports to address the limitations and pitfalls of previous interventions; however, it remains entangled in a web of legal and political complexities, mirroring historical issues surrounding foreign military intervention.

Legal and Political Complexities

The R2P operates within the existing international legal framework established since 1945, necessitating the creation of exceptional circumstances to justify intervention and protect state sovereignty. Despite its intent to bring about significant changes, the R2P does not fundamentally alter the legality of intervention, rendering it susceptible to politicization and contentious debates within the international sphere. This susceptibility often leads to diplomatic standoffs and prevents consensus, hindering effective intervention where urgently needed.

Sovereignty and Intervention

An ongoing debate surrounding the R2P centers on the balancing act between sovereignty and intervention. The doctrine seeks to realign state sovereignty with human rights, introducing a paradigm shift that challenges traditional interpretations of state autonomy. However, this realignment has also ignited controversy and resistance from certain states that perceive external intervention as a breach of their sovereignty, leading to divergent perspectives and hindering multilateral cooperation for humanitarian military action.

Global Diplomatic Standoffs

The history of R2P implementation is rife with examples of global diplomatic standoffs, particularly within the United Nations Security Council. The divergent positions of permanent members and the resulting impasse due to veto powers have stymied the swift and effective deployment of military intervention in critical humanitarian crises, such as the Syrian civil war. These prolonged standoffs highlight the challenges of reconciling divergent national interests and humanitarian imperatives within the framework of the R2P.

Conclusion

The second chapter underscores the intricate challenges and controversies entwined with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. It emphasizes the need for nuanced and pragmatic approaches to navigate the legal and political complexities of R2P, fostering meaningful multilateral cooperation to effectively address humanitarian crises while respecting state sovereignty. Addressing these issues is imperative in shaping the future of humanitarian military intervention and advancing the protection of vulnerable populations worldwide.

The Impact of the New International Order on Sovereignty and Human Rights

The end of the Cold War and the development of PEST factors have significantly influenced the international order, leading to increased interconnectedness of societies and heightened globalization. This shift has prompted a reevaluation of traditional notions of sovereignty and human rights, extending their influence beyond borders (Kaldor, 2008).

The concept of sovereignty has evolved towards a more humanized perspective, necessitating legitimate exceptions to the traditional principle of non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs for the protection of its sovereignty. As a result of global interconnectedness, human rights have become standardized, or at least are moving in that direction, with these principles increasingly recognized, albeit not universally, by both government states and their populations. This progress reflects a growing human conscience that transcends the limitations imposed by certain state governments and traditional doctrines.

The “International Community Doctrine” conference, as presented in Blair’s Chicago Speech in April 1999, highlighted the inevitability of being part of global interdependence, emphasizing that all nations are internationalists, whether by choice or not, due to the impact of external changes. Similarly, the statement by Secretary-General K. Annan in the Annual Report of December 1999 underscored the necessity of global engagement in a global era, where the collective interest often aligns with national interests. Moreover, in cases necessitating forceful intervention, it is crucial to ensure that the Security Council, entrusted with authorizing force under international law, is prepared to address the ensuing challenges.

This transformative shift in the international order underscores the increasing importance of global engagement and collective interests, necessitating a reevaluation of traditional doctrines and approaches to sovereignty, human rights, and international intervention.

Analysis of Human Security Studies and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The rise of Human Security Studies, initially defined in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Report of 1994, aimed to shift the focus of security studies from a state-centred perspective to one centred on the security of humanity. This transition was intended to prioritize the freedom from fear, addressing the threat of violence, and the freedom from want, addressing threats related to underdeveloped societies, such as deprivation of Human Rights, corruption, human abuses, torture, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity.

Kerr (2013) emphasizes the essentiality of Human Security, particularly in humanitarian crises and emergencies, stressing the need to focus on humanity. Consequently, the inclusion of Human Security in the political agenda became critically important. Furthermore, Human Security encompasses the inter-state practice, driving the establishment and support of new international humanitarian agencies focused on the protection of individuals rather than states. These entities apply mechanisms of development and human rights to monitor and identify potential threats, ultimately aiming to mitigate future crises.

Conversely, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report of 2001 established three pillars, leading to the creation of international organizations dedicated to the prevention of potential conflicts. For instance, ‘The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,’ established in 2008, works in close collaboration with supporting governments and leading figures in the Human Rights field. The organization’s primary goal is to uphold the norm of the Responsibility to Protect, ensuring that the international community never again fails to intervene and halt crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

The convergence of Human Security Studies and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) suggests that R2P could materialize the theory of human security, creating processes for monitoring and preventing conflicts. This integration potentially increases the opportunities for averting instances of state intervention compared to the era preceding the R2P doctrine. This holistic approach underscores the potential for transformative progress in international relations and humanitarian interventions.

The alignment of these concepts reflects a significant shift towards prioritizing the security and protection of humanity, marking a pivotal evolution in addressing global challenges and crises.

The mechanisms of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine raise critical questions regarding both the legality and legitimacy of military intervention decisions.

The UNSC’s decision-making process for military intervention revolves around a consensual approach seeking unanimity to authorize such actions. However, the presumption of legality is a subject of debate. UN resolutions, deemed coercive diplomacy, carry legal binding force and are issued under the framework of Chapter 7, Article 42 of the UN Charter, implying that non-compliance can lead to military intervention. Nonetheless, the paradox arises from the veto power held by the UNSC’s Permanent Members (P-5), leading to the vetoing of resolutions on the grounds of illegality, as observed in the case of Syria. This challenges the presumption of legality and raises concerns about its consistent application.

The consensual nature of military intervention from its inception presents inherent difficulties in sustaining the securitization of new issues to garner consensus among UNSC members. Convincing others of the priority and necessity of addressing specific challenges forms a key obstacle in the decision-making process.

Regarding the justification for military intervention, it is essential to consider the intention behind the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report of 2001. The report sought to instigate discussions on issues concerning human security and protection, particularly in the context of overwhelming conflict and war, in order to justify considering the use of military force to deter belligerents. This aligns with the doctrine of the “just war,” seeking moral justification and assessing the exception of the principle of non-intervention as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In conclusion, the complexities surrounding the mechanisms of the UNSC and the R2P doctrine underscore the need for nuanced and pragmatic approaches to navigate the legal and moral considerations of military intervention. These considerations are integral to fostering meaningful multilateral cooperation and effectively addressing humanitarian crises while respecting the principles of international law and legitimacy.

Chapter 3: UN Security Council Veto Powers and Democratic Representativeness

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is equipped with a unique structure that encompasses the veto power vested in the Permanent Members (P-5), ensuring autonomy in foreign military intervention decisions. This chapter aims to scrutinize the implications of the P-5 veto power and the democratic representativeness of the UNSC’s internal system in the context of interventions, particularly focusing on the Syrian conflict.

The Purpose of UNSC Veto Power

The inception of the UNSC in 1945 heralded the establishment of the P-5’s veto power, intending to guarantee autonomy over foreign military intervention within a framework that facilitates legitimization by the remaining members. The veto power is instrumental in deciding on crucial matters necessitating substantial military and financial commitments from contributing states. This structural mechanism seeks to maintain a balance of power and accountability while safeguarding the interests of the P-5.

Analysis of Ideological Unevenness and Consensual Results

Despite member states’ commitment to a multilateral framework, there exists an observable divergence in ideologies and political preferences reflected in the consensual outcomes of the UNSC. The utilization of the term ‘the P-5 failed’ endeavors to underscore the joint responsibility of the UNSC for their veto power, acknowledging the complexities and implications of their decisions as an entity rather than singling out specific members. It highlights the recognition of shared accountability within the UNSC for the ramifications of the veto power in shaping intervention policies.

Scrutiny of Democratic Representativeness

A critical component of this analysis involves evaluating the democratic representativeness of the UNSC’s internal system, particularly in the context of interventions. The unevenness of political ideologies and preferences among members raises pertinent questions about the democratic functioning of the UNSC, engendering complexities in consensus-building and decision-making processes. This scrutiny serves to unravel the intricacies of democratic representation within the UNSC, attuned to the evolving international landscape and the exigencies of intervention policies.

In conclusion, the analysis of the UNSC veto powers and its impact on democratic representativeness underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the structural mechanisms guiding foreign military interventions. It sheds light on the complexities inherent in the consensual outcomes and the joint responsibility of the P-5 for their decisions, encapsulating the multifaceted nature of intervention policies within the UNSC. This chapter seeks to provoke critical discourse surrounding the operational dynamics of the UNSC and its implications for global security and humanitarian interventions.

Impact of Peacekeeping Operations on UN Security Council Resolutions for Syria

The shift towards prioritizing peacekeeping operations has significantly influenced the UN Security Council’s capacity to deliver robust resolutions for the Syrian crisis. Past military interventions, aimed at protecting populations, have eroded the credibility of UN military intervention primarily designed to safeguard governments. The accumulation of unsatisfactory military operations, often lacking a just cause, has undermined the legitimacy of UN’s humanitarian initiatives.

Notably, interventions such as the UN-France intervention in Rwanda (1994) faced criticism for prioritizing the protection of government officials responsible for ethnic cleansing, rather than safeguarding the massacre’s victims. This, combined with delays in the UN response, as emphasized by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, epitomizes the profound impact of flawed UN military interventions on affected populations.

The surge in peacekeeping operations, particularly post the Kosovo intervention in 1999, underscore the UN’s recognition of peacekeeping as a pivotal tool in promoting and maintaining international peace. This shift is exemplified by the UN’s launch of approximately 51 Peacekeeping Operations in Africa from 2000-2015, often in collaboration with regional organizations like ECOWAS and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The Security Council’s inclination towards endorsing resolutions for humanitarian intervention led by regional organizations stems from the diverse support they offer, encompassing financial resources, military training, personnel, and conscription.

However, the distinct dynamics within the Arab region pose challenges in establishing comparable UN peacekeeping operations, particularly with regional organizations like the Arab League, whose limited influence hinders their central role in conflict resolution. The unique complexities prevalent in the Middle East necessitate a tailored approach to UN intervention strategies, acknowledging the region’s distinct characteristics and conflicts.

The evolving landscape of international peace and security underscores the compelling need for nuanced and adaptable UN intervention frameworks, capable of addressing region-specific challenges effectively. Contextually sensitive strategies are imperative to mitigate humanitarian crises and protect vulnerable populations in the Middle East and beyond.

The Role of Past Military Interventions in Shaping P-5 Decision Making

The impact of past military interventions, particularly the 2011 Operation Unified Protector in Libya, has significantly influenced the decision-making process of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Permanent Members (P-5). The outcomes and aftermath of such interventions have shaped the approach of the P-5 towards future military actions under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The complexities and repercussions of these interventions have manifested in the hesitation and cautious approach of the P-5 towards authorizing multilateral military intervention, reflecting significant considerations of political, social, and regional implications.

Libya and the Unintended Consequences

The 2011 military intervention in Libya under the R2P doctrine, through NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, has raised critical concerns and controversies. While widely perceived as a success, with emphasis on civilian protection, the nature of the intervention and its aftermath have been subject to intense scrutiny. Commentators have highlighted discrepancies between the intended principles of R2P and the actual implementation of military force in Libya. Criticisms centered on the deviation from the responsibility of the Libyan government to protect its population, leading to interpretations of the Western objective as an endeavor to effect a regime change rather than solely safeguarding civilians.

Impact of Previous Interventions on P-5 Decision-Making

The experiences and lessons learned from interventions such as the US/Iraq operation in 2003 and the subsequent turmoil and rise of terrorism in the region have significantly influenced the decision-making process of the P-5 within the UNSC. The unintended repercussions, including social and political instability and the surge of terror groups following military interventions, have sparked a cautious approach among the P-5, particularly in the context of the Syrian civil war. The aftermath of these interventions has underscored the necessity for comprehensive post-intervention assistance and the critical evaluation of the long-term consequences before endorsing similar actions. These factors have contributed to the reluctance of the P-5 to readily authorize multilateral military interventions under the R2P, prioritizing careful consideration of the potential ramifications on regional stability and global security.

P-5 Preferences and the Shift Towards Peacekeeping Operations

The cautious approach of the P-5 towards multilateral military interventions has led to a preference for peacekeeping operations, apprehending the potential challenges posed by foreign intervention. The complexities and unique dynamics of the Syrian conflict have further reinforced the inclination towards peacekeeping efforts, acknowledging the obstacles presented by the region’s isolationism and the lack of a viable conjoined regional effort to address the conflict comprehensively. The challenges observed in the Syrian context, along with the implications of past interventions, have emphasized the significance of local knowledge and assertiveness in peacekeeping operations, presenting a cost-effective and nuanced approach to conflict resolution.

Conclusion

The complex landscape shaped by past military interventions has significantly influenced the P-5 decision-making within the UNSC, fostering a cautious approach towards multilateral military actions under the R2P doctrine. The lessons learned from previous interventions, alongside the unintended consequences and challenges observed, have contributed to the preference for peacekeeping operations and careful considerations of the long-term implications of potential military interventions. The unique characteristics of the Syrian conflict, including isolationism and regional dynamics, further reinforce the strategic shift towards peacekeeping efforts, highlighting the intrinsic complexities of foreign military intervention and the imperative need for comprehensive assessments before authorizing multilateral actions.

This careful and nuanced approach underscores the gravity of the decision-making process within the UNSC, reflecting the evolving dynamics of international security and the imperative to prioritize regional stability and global security considerations.

Liberal Internationalism Crisis and the Incidence of War –

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Vetoed R2P for Syria

By 2012 the United Nations Security Council started to meet for numerous consensus processes for Syria, to decide whether they could issue a resolution at Level VII of the UN Charter implying the use of military force. However, efforts for orchestrating effective enforcement were blocked principally by Russia and China. As a consequence, the lack of a prompt response could have contributed to the aggravation of the war. Nowadays, Syria is a fragmented state and scenario of destruction, terrorism, massive human rights violations and crimes against humanity. The question of this dissertation focuses on what stopped P-5 members from agreeing on international military intervention from the onset of the conflict? Being issues on state sovereignty against human rights the heading of the discussion. This dissertation will argue that the main reason why there was no agreement in launching military intervention under the umbrella of R2P against the government of Bashar Al-Assad corresponds to the current and problematic status of the military intervention per se, and to the different political ideologies of the UN P-5 members. Thus the R2P does not bring substantial structural changes and has set re-definitions on the conceptualisation of state sovereignty related to human rights, and should serve as guidance for those who are willing to embrace these values…

“We leave a century of unparalleled suffering and violence. Our greatest, most enduring test remains our ability to gain the respect and support of the world’s peoples.” (Koffi Annan, speech of 19 September 1999).

“Global interdependence requires global values commonly or evenly applied. But sometimes force is necessary to get the space for those values to be applied.” (Tony Blair, speech of 7 April 2002).

“This was the unpromising environment in which the concept of the responsibility to protect was born, and we need to take all that background into account if we are to appreciate just how significant, how groundbreaking, this new concept is.” (Gareth Evans, speech of 11 April 2008).

On the 4th, of October 2011, seven months after the violent outbreak in Syria, the United Nations Security Council called for a consensus debate to approve a robust resolution. This first was to ask the Assad’s regime to strengthen its operations avoiding the use of force against its population. However, the resolution was vetoed by Russia and China on grounds of an inadequate accusatory approach towards Damascus, and disruption of foreign state sovereignty against the Syrian government, respectively. This was only the first failing discussion for launching a robust plan to mitigate Bashar Assad’s regime. Thirteen other R2P robust military consensus were arranged between 2011 and 2019, all of them blocked by the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent, by China who vetoed eight times. In consequence, the civil war in Syria has aggravated to date, being the longest and deadliest war in the last few years that has displaced millions of civilians and killed around 500,000 people. On the other hand, the problematic dilemma of International military intervention the UN has ever faced, based on norms as well as on the value of humanitarian protection, seemed to have been out-framed by the ongoing transformations of the international society and awakening awareness of Human Rights by the twentieth one century. Nevertheless, in response to the humanitarian crises of the nineties such as in Rwanda 1994 and Somalia 1995, a new approach to international military intervention was launched in the new century 2001-2004 termed ‘The Responsibility to Protect.’

This dissertation will argue that although R2P claims to be the latest version of humanitarian military intervention, it has the same difficulties as the past. Foreign military intervention has ever been critical and a highly politicised matter intending to justify the existence of extraordinary circumstances to trigger what would normally be an outlaw practice against state sovereignty. Conditioned by the same legal international structure since 1945, the R2P is mainly concerned with finding justification for military intervention to protect others for which the need to create an exception in the legal framework is required. Hence the weakness of the R2P as it does not bring significant changes to the legality of intervention thus it remains a politicised matter. Nevertheless, it serves as a guiding theory to reflect on the use of military force towards halting human rights violations. This essay will refer to the R2P as a ‘doctrine’ of intervention and is divided into two parts. Part one has two chapters, the first will attempt to answer the question such as whether R2P is the latest version of military intervention? And the second, what are the current challenges of the doctrine? Part two has also two chapters, the third, will focus on the consensus for authorising robust resolutions for Syria from the onset of the war in 2011 to 2019, and will answer the questions of what enables Security Council Permanent Members (China & Russia ) veto power? And why did principally Russia veto?

The R2P first defined by the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, was quickly adopted by the UN mechanisms for violence prevention and protection of civilians. Indeed, the R2P is based on two dimensions: preventive and reactive principally. Is formed though by three pillars which read as, ‘the responsibility to prevent’, ‘the responsibility to protect’ and ‘the responsibility to rebuild’ this last referring to the post-military operation assistance. The R2P from the onset (2001) has revolutionised the way states could interpret the traditional notions of sovereignty versus human rights. The R2P sought after establishing ever since, the responsibility to protect populations remains primarily on the governments of heads of states, that sovereignty is also a principle and right of individuals to be upholders, whereas the state exists in function to people and not to governments or regimes. Nevertheless, the R2P shed light on the dilemma of sovereignty, the existing international legal structure has not changed thus. To understand the R2P robust dimension, this dissertation is considering the evolution of military intervention. Starting in the nineteenth century, it moved towards the twentieth century improving to a great degree with the prohibition of aggressive wars at the end of the Second World War, and with the consolidation of the United Nations in 1945. Foreign military interventions based on humanitarian purposes were realised in a more freely liberal approach as NATO in Kosovo 1999, or US- Iraq 2003. In the new millennium however, the R2P is seen as being even more restrictive in state initiatives for military intervention that targets the government military as happened in Libya in 2011, regarded as one of the main precedents for some members of the Security Council to veto on robust resolutions since then.  

The results of this analysis find the main functionality of the R2P is to facilitate a room for debate with possibilities to exert doctrinal influence over the UN directorate decision-makers for coinciding in military intervention. But this will work most effectively only for cases when there is a need for an immediate urgent response, when the target is against an identifiable militancy and when there is enough evidence that they are incurring crimes against humanity. However well-intentioned, the R2P could delay the discussion and entertain the focus of military intervention by opening place to other peacekeeping instruments with less definite time frames such as UN Peacekeeping Operations. Nevertheless, the particular characteristics of the war have to be taken into consideration to exert conclusions on military intervention applied as the solution to crimes against humanity.

Chapter 4- Why did the UNSC fail to approve robust R2P resolutions for Syria?

Previously it was argued the internal structure of votation against non-procedural matters is being left intentionally to the SC. The purpose of the UNSC veto power from the onset of the UN in 1945, was to guarantee autonomy on foreign military intervention inside a structure that enables legitimation by the rest of its members (Pattison 2010). To decide on matters that will require a compromised military and financial budget to states that can contribute to them. On the other side, although member states have a compromise as members of a multilateral framework, there was noted an unevenness of ideologies and political preferences reflected in the consensual results. These issues will be further analysed as follows. For this purpose, this chapter will use the term ‘the P-5 failed’ to avoid mentioning Russia and China, particularly, and in recognition of the SC’s joint responsibility for their veto power.

First, one of the leading causes of why the Security Council’s failure to deliver robust resolutions for Syria might be due to a preferential change for launching Peacekeeping operations. Towards the new millennium, Peacekeeping operations rose to a considerable extent, just between 1991 and 1993 the international system witnessed an eight-fold increase in the number of UN peacekeeping budgets (Jamison 2011, 367, para. 1). After the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the UN increased the number of peacekeeping operations (Gromes 2019, 25). Peacekeeping operations are defined in the UN mission narratives as one of the most effective tools available to the UN in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and order. Only in Africa since the year 2000 – 2015, the UN launched about 51 Peacekeeping Operations, many of them in partnerships with regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. This can explain why the SC seemed to have been more agreeable to approving resolutions for humanitarian intervention led by regional organisations, as they benefit from financial support from different sources, as well as military training, personnel and conscription. However, the scenario in the Arab region is different from Africa. The Arab League, known as the oldest and weakest regional organisation unable to play a central role when conflicts arise, is deemed ineffective at the regional peace engagement. (ref)

Secondly, another factor that might have curbed the decision of the P-5 away from military intervention, in essence, is the consequences of the first time R2P military intervention in Libya in 2011. Though it was by mainly all points of critics a success, some commentators noted the Operation Unifier Protector launched by NATO on 19th March 2011 – 31st March 2011, by SC Resolutions 1970 – 1973 did not reflect the principles of the R2P. They did not argue the responsibility of the Libyan government to protect its population but condoned the use of force against innocent civilians. The narrative of the resolutions suggested that the Western objective was to punish the Gaddafi regime, for substituting it from power. That, from its side, Russia and China opined the NATO intention might have gone too far, similar to the encountered opinions recalling the incidents of the US/Iraq 2003 for regime change. The UN P-5 ought to give careful consideration to terrorism upsurge in the Middle East before launching military interventions. There are theoretical explanations that validate foreign military intervention can ignite global terror upsurges such as Al-Qa’ida and ISIS, to take over territories as is the current case of the Syrian state. Especially when there is no provision of post-intervention assistance or the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ as in Libya after NATO 2011. It could be said, that the lessons learned from previous operations are a substantial base of information that, however, is still in development. The murder of the Libyan mandatory Mr Gaddafi the post-NATO operation and followed political and social instability created a fertile ground for terror groups to increase across the regions. The post-US/Iraq 2003 preventive operation to dismantle the regime of S. Hussein created the same chaos and uncountable civil conflicts that in the end, to a great certainty, suggested deception by the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, the Special Commission report on post- Iraq operation acknowledged, that there was not sufficient proof that Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction from the UN Inspection Commission (Duelfer 2016). The latter reasons capsule signifies the account for understanding why SC can have a preference for peacekeeping operations. It benefits from the assertiveness of local knowledge and is also cost-effective as there is a chance to compromise the region’s military strength and finances, as well as other independent actors, such as the EU and private donors. However, the problem of Syria is of a different type; the isolationism it has formed amongst its region makes the prospect of a conjoined regional effort to alleviate the conflict rather impossible. Indeed, Syria was suspended by the Arab League in November 2011 for failing to comply with the peace plan and was subjected to sanctions. Now, the Syrian government only relies on help from Iran and Russia and some international aid when this can get authorised. This last, is the most problematic characteristic of this war, as justifications of the Russian protection to Assad’s government seem not to be in line with humanitarian causes. Meanwhile, this war intensified with time, especially with the unilateral military support of Russia since 2015, to Assad’s government, and the temporary US troops’ deployment in Syria from 2017-2019 in support of the rebel Kurdish Liberation Army. None of these interventions are fully legitimate nor authorised by the UNSC. Thus, it can be inferred the perceived SC crisis, based on the performance of past military interventions of the last twenty-five years, bolstered with P-2 members’ performance outside the UN framework, making the consensus for a conjoined R2P multilateral military intervention more difficult to approve, as highly dependable of the politics of foreign intervention of each P-2 members’s supporting sides of the conflict.

Third, the Syrian war has been an ongoing state since 2011, without a timeframe prospect for real improvement after all-encompassing methods of the UN, particularly of the R2P, have been applied without a determinant cease-to-fire. The current way of operations of the UN does not offer a broader consensus or a just process to decide when the plan for non-coercive measures has been stretched enough waiting for the subjective actor to step forwards into real changes. The suggestion of the UN enlargement, however, brings an alternative to strengthening the representativeness and performance of the Security Council for approving robust SCRs, the fact is that it can only be a hope, not a reliable solution to the problem. Thus, it should focus on the effectiveness of the UNSC that, in the case of Syria, they were yet able to Pass Presidential Statements or SCR at level VI of the U.N. Charter. E.g. The International Agreement to engage the Syrian government of Assad to ban the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) following the incident in Ghouta, in Sept 2013, killing 300 civilians. It was temporarily effective as another allegation of government use of WMD arose subsequently as the last in April 2018. Taking a punitive approach, the US government claimed ‘has intensely persuaded calibrated sanctions to deprive the regime of resources needed to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the regime to step down, and allow for a democratic transition, by Executive order 13572, April 2011.’ Thus, there is a lack of time frame for the subjective actor to comply with ‘suggestions made’ in ways of Presidential Statements of the SC. In other words, there is a lack of coercion to drive subjecting actors to strengthen the points made by the UN General Assembly to take a real effect towards pacifism. As a consequence, the process for resolving the war in Syria has extended day-by-day as a new threshold for new strategies emerged. It is therefore non-feasible to imagine that without coercion, there is not a compelling factor that will push belligerents or outlaw governments to stop their derogatory military operations on its people. For instance, the slow success of the diplomatic approach of the Geneva Peace Talks which started by the end of 2012, could potentially be halted by a lack of strategic compromise or a lack of Syrian government collaboration with the Constitutional Commission for Syria. In consideration of the long-lasting profile the Syrian war has taken to this moment, there is no guarantee that the current diplomatic measures to alleviate the war will be useful, they are indeed conditioned to the motions set by the P-2 powerful states of Russia and the US at the point of conflict, as well as at the SC level vetoed resolutions. In this respect, there are two considerations to make. First, Resolutions at Level VII of the UN Chapter still carry a coercive diplomatic power and are taught the ultimate warning before triggering a military defence in case of non-compliance. The behaviour of Russia at the SC consensus, in particular, shows his intentions were not mainly to make Assad’s government comply with SC or Western petitions to abandon his administration, though, is one of the objectives of the Special Constitutional Commission for Syria. The decision on whether Assad’s government should go or not depends on actual political preferences, rather than on constitutional facts, or upon evidence of human rights violations. On his very own argument, Mr Assad, claims his military strategy aims at deterring terror, “the fight is against terrorism,” thus the international community should support his government. Arguments that are in line with the way Russia has for doing foreign policy, the military support to the Assad’s government is significant enough to be qualified as utterly protective.

Fourth, In any instance, it is unclear how the UNSC will be able to respond to humanitarian crises in any way that will imply military intervention against a government state that resists an international association. The ICISS Report 2001 claims, 

‘We are clear the Security Council should be the first port of call on any matter relating to military intervention for human protection purposes, the question remains whether it should be the last. Given the Council’s past inability or unwillingness to fulfil the role expected of it, if the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to deal with such a proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative means of discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted. What are the options in this respect?’ (ICISS 2001 : 53, para. 6.28). 

The problem consists of who has the authority to intervene when all other UNSC methods to encourage a head of state to step down or to stop their operations failed. The matter of who is next legitimate can be confusing in fragmented societies and regions. In cases where human rights issues take a great stake, the inquiry ought to satisfy the question about whether there is a jus – cause to claim intervention then, there will be a place for an intervener. It should comply with qualities and values to be able to accomplish humanitarian goals, as well as, to have the capacity to respond in satisfactory ways to the ethics of war (jus-in-bellum) to the quantified and qualified collective of massive humanitarian crises. Besides, it should comply with the four requirements to render a just cause and the intervener legitimate (Thakur 2013; Pattison 2010, p. 393). Legitimacy in this context means the morality to act, it is a social construct that will be given by the civil and international society that will recognise, accept and support the authority of certain bodies to take action in cases of humanitarian crises (Pattison 2010: ). Legitimacy, in its narrow context, refers to the public support of a political decision regardless of its legality and this event can be qualified as ‘adequate’ or ‘fully legitimate’ (Pattison 2010). Providing that in the current International Law, the UNSC is the only authority to legalise robust humanitarian intervention, all the other actors will enjoy adequate legitimacy unless appointed by the SC. For instance, NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) had adequate legitimacy because there was no SC resolution in place. However, Libya was fully-legitimated. This decentralisation of the UN’s duty to act is well understood and defined in the (ICISS 2001: 53-55) report, pointing at first the General Assembly to persuade SC decisions, and then, to the regional authorities that in the case of the Middle East seems to be inefficient enough. However, there is no definition of how these actors will intervene if SC becomes deadlocked. Thus the idea of the R2P consensus can be considered a failure of the West (Mc’Cormack 2011) in providing control and effectiveness for preventing upsurges of human rights violations to a great extent. The idea of legalising a policy for intervention could mean a back door for state imperialism. In any way, decisions at the SC level are highly political in terms of military intervention. It can be attributed, therefore, that peacekeeping operations developed in the last few years as these could grow in partnership between the regions and the UN, and they do not intend to involve promptly coercive or aggressive military intervention. These focus on protecting civilians and enforcing the arms embargo. Indeed, peacekeeping operations seem to be better aligned with the ideal of Just-War theories, as it encompasses a binary dimension (Chapter 1,) and the use of force is justified only for acts of self-defence. The UNSC’s preference for peacekeeping operations had stirred away from the probability of military intervention instead. In the Post-NATO Kosovo 1999, it was observed the incidents of international humanitarian intervention increased, but the time it took to launch operations in response to humanitarian crises also increased. Although there is progress in this area, it still takes 18 months to develop an operation fully that results in significant negative consequences for endangered civilians. Some commentators alleged, that the human loss was greater than if there would not have been any intervention at all. Nevertheless, The supporting theories of the JWT seem to have been re-invented to contemporary contexts, as increasing human rights claiming the rights of combatants are for everyone the same (Walzer on double casualty), and activism against war, makes the prospect of military intervention decline. The ‘new state of war’ as defined by Kaldor 2016 tends to create different sides judged by similarities of ideology and identity. On the same line, one of the reasons why military intervention has increased in responsiveness could be down to the increasing capacity of the UN R2P to launch other methods. Referring to the Presidential Statements, economic sanctions and the Geneva Peace Talk that started in 2012 and is an ongoing process to date. That could be thought of as sufficient enough to resolve the conflict, but meanwhile, these other alternatives were applied, also allowing the intensification of the military. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is hardly any due diligence mechanism by the UN that will set the limits or the priorities on when the matter should be resolved. Politicisation at the higher level of the Security Council is not precisely followers of intelligence mechanisms and advice but yet tied to the will of the political power of the great nations of the world, of their political interest, identities, and morality versus their mindsets about sovereignty. In this regard, it can be concluded that military intervention inscribed in the R2P protective narrative remains highly politicised and realist in most of its sense.

Finally, in a more Liberal sense, R2P could have inhibited Blair’s doctrine have fuelled P5 members to launch military intervention. By the end of the last century (1999) when the new progressive centre-left at the head of U.K. MP T. Blair and US Pr G. Clinton, carried interventions in Iraq and Iran, and subsequently in Kosovo, they claimed to have been empowered by concepts of international community values to protect strangers. However, the world turned a corner from military liberal interventions towards consensual processes orchestrated by the SC. The R2P doctrine could have limited P-5 freedom for the military intervention of ‘regime change’ as they did in the past by the US supported by the UK in 1999 and in 2003, for two reasons. First, because R2P encompasses that all other methods should have been applied before the military intervention will be seriously considered, and secondly because the previous Kosovo 1999 and US/Iraq 2003 were not legitimated, potentially a risk for conflicting diplomacy. Also, The UN has steered into protecting measures aiming at literally this tactic and seems to be refusing to attack heads of government states, to save bloodshed or to avoid disruption in the ME region. They were thus focusing on Peacekeeping operations as discussed previously.

References ( not provided in full)

G Wilson, “Applying the R2P to the Arab Spring”, Liverpool Law Review, (Liverpool, Springer, 2014), pp.164-171. DOI 10.1007/s10991-014-9151-6

Accessed on: 28/08/2020.

Bellamy, AJ, & Davies, SE 2011, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect : From Words to Deeds, Taylor & Francis Group, London. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [28 August 2020].

UN, “Presidential Statement of the SC”, S/PRST/2019/4 (UN, 7th May 2019), p. 1, para. 3.

P. Williams “Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: challenges and solutions”, conference (Nov 2015).

Available at: https://youtu.be/k8Np_yXt7wc – Accessed on 20/08/2020.

Who Supports Mr Putin?

March 2022

Analysing the Russian democratic participation in the 2016 elections, its tendencies and type of voters.

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International Humanitarian Law

What has gone wrong with the Israel/ Palestine War 2023- Executive Report

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Why are deadly wars still happening in the twenty-first century? 

Karem Warton 

Introduction

The Liberal project is in crisis because it is imperfect and yet exclusive, or yet depending upon membership. E.g. The Ukraine case was on hold for eight years since Crimea 2014, whilst looking for membership and regional inclusion, regardless of the threat of being invaded by Russia, a mistake the world now has to pay. The next question is how to prompt states with a transitional status to resolve it, who is in charge? 

Liberal Internationalism needs to be better understood on the basis that is achievable and available to those capable of embracing it, but that as a state system will not be ignited on its own.  In this field, the International Society plays a paramount role as the advocate for Liberalism that requires representation and participation as a matter of policy choice.

Overseeing the role of the International Society in procuring a liberal international system is rather a complex matter because the international society can choose their behaviour and adopt non-liberal functioning, thus, the crisis of liberal internationalism starts with the way international actors’ decisions affect each other. So, this essay will attempt to raise consciousness to a better understanding of Liberal Internationalism by starting with the definition and relevance of the international society. 

Understanding the International Society

The International Society is paramount to inter-state relations and its institutions, where success will be achieved upon their civilized collaboration. Formed by state international representatives, the International Society plays a decisive role in driving successful inter-state collaboration to convey international agreements, treaties, alliances and policies. In an anarchical world, where the standards of sovereignty and governance are not regulated by a natural supreme authority, states must collaborate into state systems to succeed in political-economic issues and to avoid the incidence of military war. Whereas international institutions will be successful if these are constructed upon the security of people rather than obeying the government’s interests. The League of Nations, also known as the predecessor of the UN, was first created in 1919 – 1946 and was successful as a political integration of European elites that joined together after having experienced the devastation of the Great War or WW1 (1914 – 1919). Signed at the Palace of Versailles (1920), was created by the most powerful states, as permanent members such as the UK, France and Germany, were joined and supported by a total of 42 republics. The objective was to deter Germany from inflicting violence and prevent another great war in Europe. Its success was principally based on the positive views and advertisement it gained through Europe and elsewhere, thus earning legitimacy and recognition of its legal existence, it is thought, has contributed to the establishment of International Law (ref). 

The rise of the League of Nations was supported by scholars such as Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the prime idea was to form an international or supranational institution that would be able to maintain international peace, resistant to conflictive actors and their military power. Thus war and conflict would be resolved or even prevented by lawful means. 

However, despite the efforts, the 1930s rising sentiments of nationalism were embraced by some of its principal members, Italy, Japan and  Germany, soon after they left the organization. ‘By the time the second world war broke out (1939), many had abandoned the League of Nations and returned to the traditions of defensive alliances and power blocs.’ The problem was not that the League of Nations disintegrated, the real problem was that a second world war could not be prevented without the existence of an international organization and collaboration. Proving that national strategy is inherently Realist, and regards the possibility of violence as another method for growth and expansion. Also proved that to raise peace and order there might exist a pushing factor that cannot be institutionalized by nature. This is the pattern that defines crises in the stream of International Relations, the constant struggle to maintain a balance between national priorities and international cooperation whilst remaining relevant.

The ES  is concerned with the normative and behavioural aspects of International Society, explaining that the crisis of liberal internationalism is due to the misconduct of some international actors Buzan (2014), a premise that makes sense as a sudden outbreak of an actor’s misconduct will disturb the state system. Such in the case of Russia/Ukraine, causes geo-political destabilization, as well as, the isolationism of Russia from world politics and leadership. 

Russian politics are suffering reputational damage worldwide and experiencing international sanctions due mainly to the dissaccordance of the powerful Western bloc with their belligerent initiative to Ukraine.

The Breakthrough of the Liberal Internationalism Crisis

The realization that states can not succeed without securing international peace and order, thus the development of the international system and the recognition of a diverse international society should be seen as a matter of choosing liberal policies. Whereas states needed to understand their pluralism and cooperate as international actors along a shared legal framework.

The incidence of war has proven to be exacerbated precisely when states are not integrated in the stream of international relations, usually transitional isolated democracies or non-members of any state system e.g. Syria has been living under the scourge of war for such a long time in part because as a country and state are isolated from international politics, their regional state-systems is ineffective nor irrelevant, nor enjoy a UN membership or recognise UN covenants and legal institutions. Likewise, Ukraine spent a long time in the limbo of politics between negotiations to join the European Union, and NATO, whilst trying to dismiss Russia as an invasor in the end it made it vulnerable to their attacks such small mistakes with a powerful negative impact that brings instability to the balance of power, and from where the world should learn its lessons. Therefore this essay proposes the crisis of Liberal Internationalism starts with the observation that it is imperfect as a construct and incomplete as a project and that it needs to be implemented to evolve positivist, pluralist, integrative and diversified. The answer to the liberal internationalism crisis, as suggested by Ikenberry 2020, is therefore more liberal internationalism. However, in the need for increasing inclusion and eradicating isolationism, a rather more precise answer would be that the rise of more regional liberal blocs will be also proposed in this essay. 

The UN, the SC and what has gone wrong? 

The UN Peace Talks for Syria

The UN-led Peace Talks are brokered dialogues driven by a forum of world leaders that join voluntarily, sporadically and lack any coercive measures. Peace Talks have been recognised as the most legitimate instrument for conflict resolutions that will promote collaborative dialogue in the discussion of peace strategies and even set an agenda, aiming at the reconciliation of the parties in conflict. The issue arrives when there is no disposition or openness to start guided dialogues and negotiation. In the absence of coercive authority, the parties in conflict might not achieve any agreement or they will be delayed for a later time, converting brokered negotiations into a lengthy process. E.g. 

Case One. Peace Talks for Syria. A process was instituted in the 2012 failure of Kofi Annan’s six-point plan for a ceasefire and the demilitarization of the Syrian war. Annan who was appointed as UN Special Envoy for Syria on the 23^rd of February 2012, convened the Geneva I Peace Talk in June 2012, where it was agreed that negotiations should be given between the Syrian government and its coalition forces, and this might include the sharing of power. After Annan failed attempts to convene in an agreement with the parties involved, and the SC blocked R2P resolutions for military intervention that targeted Mr Assad’s government a third time, he stepped down as UN special official by the last quarter of 2012. The Geneva I peace talk was relevant as the primary premises towards state reconstruction were set, referring to the inclusion of Syrian coalitions in the decision-making process for political transition.  Subsequent talks carried on implementing the first premises, although the implementation plan was interrupted by the dynamics of the war on the ground. On the other hand, the limited availability and capacity of the Syrian government to truly reconcile its goals with coalition forces, reflected in the inability to assist in political dialogue at the peace talks, was the real barrier to peace-building and ceasefire. Understanding that populations that live under authoritarian regimes, like in Syria, are demanding political transition. Reforms are usually processes that are encouraged and availed by external forces or states as many of the UN members reiterated through the multiple Geneva talks, that led to the formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee reaffirmed by October 2019, responsible for the political transition basis and the writing of a new constitution to replace the Syrian Constitution of the 2012. The Geneva II Peace Talk of 24^th January 2014 formed to discuss Syrian Security was arranged by diplomats of the UN, US and Russia, but again the lack of inclusion of the coalition forces has constrained the attempts for brokered dialogue. However, by November 2013, the Syrian representative announced their official delegation was not going to hand on power to others, a repetitive stance seen during the years of conflict. Whilst the British-based opposition group The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights informed, the number of deaths reached was 140,000 civilians, and as many as 50,000 people were living in opposition towns, the target of the Syrian military attacks. Mr Assad’s officials referred to their unwillingness to negotiate with terrorists and alleged that Syrian officials routinely named terrorists to anyone opposing to government. The Peace Talk in Vienna on the 14th of November 2015, signified another international opportunity for political contestation and for reinforcing planning for the Syrian peace reconstruction, but was hindered by the lack of decision on the representative forces. The meeting was prepared this time by the newly formed International Syria Support Group (ISSG), whose members are state actors including superpowers such as Germany and France. It reunited 20 countries of the International Community with Russia and the US co-chairing the talk given at the level of Foreign Ministers. 

Theoretically, there were constructive outcomes set out at the meeting, such as the work to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria within six months. Also, the planned schedule for drafting a new constitution and holding a free and fair U.N.-supervised election within 18 months, according to a joint statement released by the United Nations, in 2015. In addition, on December 18th of the same year, the UN Security Council Unanimously Adopted Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing a Road Map for the Peace Process in Syria and setting a Timetable for Talks. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Philip Hammond, emphasized that a national ceasefire must be given in line with the political transition, a process that must involve the departure of President Assad, likewise with the US Secretary J Kerry’s views. It was not yet until October 2019, that the confirmation of the formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee. Peace Talks for Syria still continue, the last round dates 15 June 2022, ‘The 18th round of Astana Syria peace talks began in the Kazakh capital amid Turkish threats of intervention against Kurdish forces and a deadlock in previous talks on drafting a constitution.’ To date, Peace Talks for Syria have converted into a forum for exerting warnings between the representative forces (Mr Assad’s warnings issued to the Turkey PM to retaliate against their anti-Kurdish forces in North Syria). Whereas the coalition forces, the civil society and the Syrian government are joining efforts in writing the new constitution by meeting separately. 

The R2P for the Case of Syria

The rise of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine discussed in the early 2000s – 2005 was finally adhered to by the UN ‘other matters’ and conditioned to the consensual unanimity of the P5 (permanent five members) Russia, China, the UK, the US and France. They meant to overcome the legality of no intervention in a state’s sovereignty in cases of genocide, or when civilians are being attacked or threatened by their own government as in the cases of Lybia (2011) and Syria (2011 to date). R2P is meant to deliver a quick robust response, or to the possibility of that if UNSC resolutions are not accomplished by the offensive side, but circumstances have created different unprecedented scenarios inadequate for its application. In December 2019, the world was still witnessing war intensified and millions of displaced Syrians fled away. 

Regardless of the moral implication that the High Commission member states hold in responding to humanitarian crises including robust meanings, in fact, the UN consensual system allows High Commission members (P-5) to make the final decision. The SC duties and functions addressed in the UN Charter chapter V, article (27), for procedural and non-procedural matters (R2P is a non-procedural matter), whereas P-5 members on non-procedural matters, (paragraph 3) enable SC to abstain. To approve a resolution at the VII level involving the use of military force, 9 votes from the Security Council and unanimity reached at the P-5.  The UN Charter informs that might not destitute the power given to the SC members in case of political discrepancies, ensuring in fact that the P-5 right of veto upon SCRs is not an illegal action. Thus, Political differences and ideological differences can be reflected in the right of veto to the SC, which remains unchangeable. Nevertheless, some arguments have formed in opposition to the right of veto upon the political representation fairness at the UN, suggesting enlargement at the level of the SC P-5. Stewart M. Patrick 2012, explains that SC is the premier organ for resolving peace and security issues, however, P-5 hasn’t changed since 1945. During this time the world distribution of power has changed, growing a lack of regional representation that could be succeeded with SC enlargement. Similarly, UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-moon supports the idea of adherence of G4 members (Brazil, Japan, India and Germany) into SC Permanent Five. However, the legality of the P-5 veto power in the Charter on resolutions for responsibility to protect can be debatable. These are exacerbated by the fact that clearly, current international law does not impose an obligation to intervene on individual states. The right of veto of any P-5 member is indeed protected under the UN Charter, therefore there is not an explicit obligation for the permanent members to reach unanimity to agree on impositions of state humanitarian intervention. The SC has not only the moral obligation to follow up with UN Charter obligations but it must react in response to imminent incidents of crimes against humanity on behalf of the international community, as defined in the UN Charter articles 24 and 39, ‘To be understood only in the sense that the SC is under an obligation to act whenever international peace and security are threatened or violated.’ Whereas SC resolutions will be given under the UN Section VII corresponding to UN legally binding mandates embracing military intervention. The UN Charter article 24(2) reviews ‘the SC shall act by the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, on the specific powers granted. In this sense, it remains contradictory, as vetoing SCRs that would help to halt human rights abuses, could be considered a breach of these provisions if no action is taken when the requirements of article (39) are fulfilled, referring to determining whether there is a threat to peace shall act under its duties involving other non-robust measures (e.g. Presidential Statements). There is not any coercion, punishment or requirement that would bind the SC to respond with military intervention in any instance, which renders once again the matter of intervention ambiguous. 

When some legal approach to the analysis of robust military intervention R2P is made, is found, some support to the practice by association to the International Law clauses. Peters 2009, argues the legality of intervention is less ambiguous in IL than in the UN Charter, as defences grounded on morality are generally accepted in the international criminal systems of the world, and apt to constitute a general principle of law in terms of Article 38(1) (c) of the ICJ statute. Nasu 2009, observes that although P-5 is not required by IL to approve resolutions of a military character, in any way agreed with Peters 2009 that intervention is justifiable, suggesting the SC P-5 is a system depending on democratic unanimity whereas non-satisfaction makes it imperfect. The UN system makes the R2P dependable upon this condition. However, there is some significant debate over the inherence of the doctrine with International Law (Rosenberg 2009; Dederer 2014). 

Russia’s veto power for the case of Syria. 

Russia might have potentially abused-de-Droit of its veto right to protect civilians as in the case of Syria. Indeed, Russia’s way of doing politics is overwhelmingly reflected in most of its international performance including at the international level. Russia has so far vetoed 14 times robust SCRs on Syria, and as in the previous example of intervention in Idlib, Russia has shown at times a willingness to negotiate. The Russian performance at the UN Security Council in the R2P consensus for Syria falls in line with the Russian approach to international politics usually adverse to the US influential stance (Ziegler, 2016; Allison, 2013). The Russian position can partly be explained as one more expression of Moscow’s long-standing aversion to fear of Western military interventions (Roy Allison: 2013,  796). Allison argues Russia has anxiety and fears towards Western intervention and regime change. Substantiated on the analysis of the incidents of state humanitarian intervention of the past 30 years, seen as the consequence of the American impetus for imperialism and state vacuum for regime change. I.e. The political instability of the Middle East, and the uprising of the Arab Spring in Syria are starkly seen by Russia as the consequences of the US – Iraq 2003 operation. However, the reasons why a great state like Russia behaves in such an anachronistic way to Western-led foreign policies remain contentious. 

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has failed to a great extent to pass robust resolutions that will enforce the end of the war by the Syrian government of Bashar – Al – Assad because Russia principally, alongside China have opposed it. Russia has argued issues on the legality of the intention of military intervention against state sovereignty and referred to the incidents of the Libya Resolutions 1970 and 1973- 2011. That ended with the destabilization of the Libyan government and the death of the then Libya mandator Gaddafi, making Libya’s security vulnerable. It has also displayed distrust on the grounds of the R2P being the backdoor for state intervention and Western dominance. Russia is being criticized by different scholars for its particular way of doing politics, which at times is inclined to mind only its own interests. E.g. Reuters 20th, Dec 2019. “Russia has opposed the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions by the 14th Dec 2019, since the start of the war in Syria in 2011. The veto was on blocking cross-border aid deliveries (equivalent to 12 months supply) from Turkey and Iraq to millions of Syrian civilians. Russia only agreed to two entries from Turkey and aid deliveries for 6 months instead (Reuters, 20/12/2019). 

It could be said, that an evident and notorious state of interest from the side of Russia and China can be appreciated thus, in disapproving Aid deliveries, as this would have resulted counterproductive to the Russian operations. Russia has been militarily involved in Syria as an ally of the Syrian government since 2015, and up to early 2020, was still struggling to displace ISIS and dominate the rebels. Aid deliveries would indicate survival and basic needs to be covered that will, directly or indirectly, strengthen the coalition forces so hardening the Russian and Syria military operations and objectives. There is no apparent reason why Russia would fear entry from Iraq, other than providing help to the Iraqi people, which probably spill over to the ISIS insurgencies. There is no real justification why once allowing the entrance from Turkey of aid deliveries they would have only accepted half of the lot. There is also a connotation of Russia and China being insensible and irresponsible. However, this can be interpreted as there is a sign that these countries are acting on behalf of their own interests only, and not under the responsibility they have as SC Permanent-Five members. Finally, Russia could manage to manipulate the SC onto another vocation round to adjust their requirement, but this was opposed by a majority. Showing that Russia can bias situations and halt collective intentions at times, but cannot be, in its majority, supported. In the end, the bigger loss is for all the innocent and defenceless people of Syria whose lives depend on humanitarian aid. However one has to wonder if the UN is really performing its responsibilities and being effective in spending all means to halt conflicts and save people from the scourge of war. 

Peace-keeping Operations, an Overview. 

Regarded as one of the most successful and effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries in navigating the difficult path from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping is indeed military operations formed to assist in the diverse stages of state-building, such as disarmament, civil protection,  peace stabilization, and so into restoring the rule of law. Through the sixty years of existence, Peacekeeping operations have proved to be more effective, as almost, depending upon partnership collaboration with the region, the local police and other regional organizations, advantage from military capacity, local expertise and budget from contributors. It is guided by three principles, consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Towards the new millennium, Peacekeeping operations rose to a considerable extent, just between 1991 1993 the international system witnessed an eight-fold increase in the number of UN peacekeeping budgets (Jamison 2011, 367, para. 1). After the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the UN increased the number of peacekeeping operations (Gromes 2019, 25). Only in Africa since the year 2000 – 2015, the UN launched about 51 Peacekeeping Operations, many of them in partnerships with regional organizations. There are currently twelve UN peacekeeping operations deployed on three continents. 

Peacekeeping operations are legitimate tools supported in the UN Charter and are meant to be part of the political solution. As argued by Nasu, 2009, finds its legal support in article 40 of the UN Charter which reads, that the SC is allowed to direct as necessary operations as part of provisional measures. Therefore peacekeeping operations are conditioned to the approval and agreement of the governments of the UN as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat most known to work in global partnership in consideration of its actors’ contributors. Partnership peacekeeping refers to the institutional collaboration between different actors to deliver effective peace operations on the ground (MacQueen 2006). Nevertheless, the past operations of Srebrenica and Rwanda, brought to UN Peacekeeping operations reputational damage as allegedly “…humanitarian help arrived in too late” (Koffi Annan’s speech Sept 1999), subsequently, a need for matching mandate to the availability of resources was reported. The subsequent reforms written in the Brahimi Report 2000, the New Horizon for Partnership Initiative 2009, and Updates 2011, are the mainly strategic, operational and tactical plans that included regional or local bodies, as accessibility, mobility and open politics for peace military operations are reported as usually well embedded by authorities. Political dialogue, support and communications at the various levels were pointed out as paramount to successful ends. 

Peacekeeping operations are more successful when planning in line with regional organizations. In part due to regional, or state military benefits from a powerful Western-modern military training and higher payments, such as the UN military partnership with Filipinas in a mission against the Syrian rebels in the Golan Heights. However, they are conditioned upon the political will and agreement from the UN security bodies, which makes it a disadvantage for states that are not members of the UN – as portrayed by J Ikenberry 2021, the issue of membership –  such as in the case of Syria, as state collaboration becomes inexistent, regional collaboration difficult, but most important there is not any political dialogue viable between the national government and the international. Whether Liberal Internationalism has worked out for everyone, hence the Syrian case is the point of inflexion to be analyzed. One global organization might be able to facilitate humanitarian help, that is what they are designed to do, but will not prevent political conflicts from happening, unless there is real open progressive politics in place, whereas regionalism would be a good tool to prevent isolationism i.e.

Military Enhancement

One of the principal arguments that amount to the failure of international institutions to maintain peace and order is the matter of consistency of military approach to the planning of grand strategy, state security and defence. The launch of Operation War-on-terror (2001) was not only the declaration of the Western war against international terrorism and the apparent new world order featuring the empowerment of the West against the Islamic state. This was also the prelude to the new US policy of military expansionism and increase in military training expenditure ($378.46B in 2002), a policy followed by Russia, China, and India that are now some of the largest. The world currently spends $1.981 trillion US dollars in 2022 compared with $1.215 billion in 2002. Although the global military expenditure stalled from 2000 – 2008, it has grown steadily to date. To this, Baylis-et-al [2019; 248] argues that “the Western countries should explain why they acquire better military equipment when they already possess the best weapons and, threats are apparently far away” which has now proven wrong with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia 2022. To date, developing countries such as Japan, Pakistan and Turkey have considerably equipped and developed their military. Thus, Grand Strategy and defense planning are inherent to national security, but military power is still preferred, in an anarchical world that still finds its ground for state-centric policy goals making war a latent possibility that is even closer when geo-political tensions are left unattended such as Ukraine/Russia 2014. Proving that if given the possibility, and in the presence of military capability states are still willing to inflict violence moved by sentiments of expansionism, power and interests. 

Grand Strategy consists of planning to manage certain circumstances and events rather than letting events manage the elites relying on the built-up of the conventional military.

When the UN Commission for Weapons of Mass Destruction was carrying out an inspection in Iraq in 2002-03 to determine whether Saddam Hussein was in actual possession of WMD, their point was never confirmed [C Duelfer 2016]. US President G. Bush was already planning the biggest military operation ever deployed in a Middle East country against an autocratic government. Twenty-one years after the elites of political intelligence are still weighing the gains and losses in the short and long terms, contentiously. 

Following up with the patterns of conventional imperialistic wars that seemed to have been reborn in 2014, when Israel invaded Gaza for regime change and sovereignty rendition, the lack of negotiation attempts before the opening of fire came to light. The world witnessed by then a US that was holding back its troops avoiding confrontations with Israel, an ally in nuclear proliferation. The UN had little to do, especially when their envoys and safe corridors were targeted, disrespecting the international order that states such as Israel convened at their membership. 

The Crisis of the Liberal Internationalism, the Changing International World Order. 

Many coincide with the idea that the most successful world order started at the end of WW2 with a US hegemonic power rising capable of bringing help in disarmament and reconstruction of Europe at the end of the war. Since then, the conceptualisation of world order was easily associated with the somehow US Hegemonic power, now with the allegation of the US power decline, the idea of the crisis of the world order is being discussed broadly. There is an important differentiation to be made between Liberal Internationalism and the world order. The first refers to the capacity of greater states to stand and embrace enlightenment, or liberal values of democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech and also includes the ever-contentious humanitarian intervention. The second refers to the balance of power whereas in a unipolar world,  the triumphant Liberalism since the end of the Cold, as liberal forums, state-systems, and liberal states were built with democratic models and liberal constitutions. However, in front of a mainly liberalized systematic world order, the nuance of deadly war is still happening. The general concern should focus on the preservation of liberal values independent of the shifts of power. There is a need to regard the liberal international order that has preceded the one we live in as inherited vital tools and structures that should be implemented. It has been argued that the crisis to this still flawed liberalism should be more liberalism. 

Consideration of previous liberal success in the world on the international could be improved by strengthening the international society, in not one that is thought to be western at the core and global at the periphery, but one that is powerful at the core and effective to the periphery, regardless of their geopolitics of the location. Through this text, it can be appreciated that political forums can work for the better and benefit from the union of their powers, as opposed to autocracy and dominant imperialism or dictatorship. 

J. Ikenberry, 2020, ‘ video’ suggests the crisis of the Liberal International Order can be resumed in three

The crisis of liberal internationalism and the regionalisation project. 

Regionalism is the synonym for openness and neo-liberal politics. 

Russia could be considered part of the Western order however, insists on fighting against its own built-up.

The creation of the United Nations (1945) has been crucial to the development of International Relations and so to raise the possibility for peace, nevertheless, the robust dimension that peace and stability imply cannot yet stand irreplaceable.

Conclusions

It would be weak to think that Russia as an international actor and ‘great country’ deserves to keep the place that it held before launching attacks in Ukraine in February 2022 in terms of its privileges of being a member of the UNSC Permanent Five,…etc.  Then, a new world order should be defined and this will need to acquire better tools against war and the prevention of conflicts using strengthening foreign policy, making peace alliances more significant, regional blocks more powerful and global, and international institutions more accepted by the ‘all the nations of the world’, redefine democracy and sovereignty in function to human rights conventions, the international justice system needs to become more powerful, and statebuilding and reconstruction a priority. Essentially, I believe the new sixth world order should be based on narratives of human security that will write agendas prioritizing the protection of citizens over any other entity and get rid of the nuance of war as happened in the past decades. The question therefore is how we could achieve this? When has our human development path gone wrong? And why? In particular the UNSC?

References:

Buzan, B, 2014 : An Introduction to the English School of IR. Cambridge Press. Pp 21-21, 47-60.

Casper, S. 2009. British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress? Manchester University Press. Pp 25-27; 65-67; 

Fratianni, M, & Savona, P 2007, Corporate, Public and Global Governance : The G8 Contribution, Taylor & Francis Group, Farnham. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. Pp 171- 174. Ebook ISBN 9780754640462. [29 August 2022].

Goncalves, M, Alves, J, Frota, C, Xia, H, & Arcot, RV 2014, Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets : Prospects for Globalization, Business Expert Press, New York. Pp 1-9. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [29 August 2022]. 

Ikenberry, J. 2020, A world safe for Democracy, Liberal Internationalism, The Crises of Global Order. University of Virginia Press.  

Leyton. P. 2018, Grand Strategy: The Idea of Grand Strategy, pp. 1-19. E-book available at:

https://www.academia.edu/44830575/Grand_Strategy

[22/08/2022].

Sylvest, C 2009, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930 : Making Progress?, Manchester University Press, Manchester. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [29 August 2022].

Websites: 

Our World in Data, Military Spending. Available at:

https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending

[22/0/2022]

The Future of the Liberal International Order with J Ikenberry and J Mearsheimer. 2021. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHdE8z_ur6A&list=WL&index=520

[25/08/2000].

Is the state of International Order in the State of Terminal Decline?  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline/

War as the unwanted permissibility of the International

Analysis of the International Relational Interactions.

Karem A W 

Introduction

Although many would have thought of the 21st Century as the period of a continuous consolidation of liberal peace and stability, the incidents of deadly wars in the new millennium such as Afghanistan (2001/14), Iraq (2003/11) and Syria (2011 to date) are an indication of yet flawed international systems. The failure to reconcile states in democratic evolution with the international world remains latent. Consequently, at some point, internationalization seems to be in need of imposition by and within the opportunity of hegemonic power. Syria, on its side, has been a different phenomenon with the intervention of Russia and the US fighting against the same grounds amidst the hesitation of the use of armed forces.  It seemed as if the mind frame of military intervention i.e. the post-US/ Iraq 2002/03 invasion, and the intervention of NATO in Libya 2011- is not regarded as adequate anymore. Instead, many other peacekeeping operations have been given priority, the middle matter between intervention and contempt in the Syrian war. Arguably, the crisis of Liberal Internationalism had precisely its worst at the failure to protect populations from becoming victims of political instability. Thus, one important point of study should focus on the analyses of the international society network and the ruling elite as their relational compromise which shall entail as well as privilege a responsibility for global peace. This paradox might lead to a particular inquiry stemming from the relational interactions type encountered at the international level to the degree of how permissible can state actors afford to be when global peace is threatened and humanitarian crises are in escalation. This essay will focus on and theorize about the relational interaction between the role of the International Society in front of the Crises of Liberalism and the consequently Incidence of War. The questions to answer are: How does war become the unwanted permissibility of International Society? For this section, I will propose two theories. Followed by the answer to Why do deadly Wars happen in the twenty-first century amongst a Liberal International Order? 

Liberal Internationalism

Liberal Internationalism can be defined as a tradition of International Relations, Ikenberry 2021 in ‘A World Safe for Democracy,’ dissemination of enlightenment values such as liberal democracy, rule of law and sovereignty. Ikenberry denotes the affluence of the termed Liberal Internationalism stems from liberal democracy better represented by the US ideological role in the international arena, commonly understood as protectionist, liberalist and to some extent interventionist. Thus, the term liberal internationalism implies the impact of hegemonic power, military power and soft power. The impact of Liberal Internationalism soft power, in theory, can be said to aim at providing a model of structure and construction of relational networks at the international level that would carry on with the implementation or establishment of liberal political models including its institutions and international courts. Whereas military power refers to the practice of intervention forced or planned (e.g. UN Peacekeeping Operations), that aims at restituting peace and order, stabilizing conflicts and protecting vulnerable populations. On the other hand, Military power is as ever, a debatable operation at the international level that struggles to achieve legitimacy and collaborative will. The US hegemony intervention of the last two decades is a paradigm in this realm. Whilst, the United Nations it is a paradigm of systematic collective and institutionalized will and action. 

The Crisis of the Liberal Internationalism, the Changing International World Order

Many coincide with the idea that the most successful world order started at the end of WW2 with a US hegemonic power rising capable of bringing help in disarmament and reconstruction of Europe at the end of the war. Since then, the conceptualisation of world order has easily associated with the US Hegemonic power, now with the allegation of the US power decline, the idea of the crisis of the world order is being discussed broadly. There is however an important differentiation to be made between Liberal Internationalism and the world order. The first refers to the capacity of greater states to stand and embrace enlightenment, or liberal values of democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech and also includes the ever-contentious humanitarian intervention. The second refers to the balance of power whereas in a unipolar world,  the triumphant Liberalism since the end of the Cold, as liberal forums, state-systems, and liberal states were built with democratic models and liberal constitutions. However, in front of a mainly liberalized systematic world order, the burden of deadly war is still happening. The general concern should focus on the preservation of liberal values independent of the shifts of power. There is a need to regard the liberal international order that has preceded the one we live in has inherited vital tools and structures that should be implemented. Thus, one could say the global order is in crisis due to a tired liberal international state system that although it remains paradigmatic in essence needs reinvention to succeed in the weaknesses of the weak, secure those that are at threat, and prevent populations suffering the scourge of war. The Ukraine case was on hold for eight years since Crimea 2014, whilst looking for membership and regional inclusion, in spite of the threat of being invaded by Russia, a mistake with serious consequences. One way to answer this dilemma should focus on analysing the misalignment of state actors and elites in relation to their role in the international community. Thus, Liberal Internationalism needs to be better understood on the basis that it is achievable and available to those who are capable of embracing it, but that as a state system will not be ignited on its own, is instead a matter of policy choice. 

The Incidence of Military War in the 21st Century

The outbreak of the war of Russia against Ukraine in March ‘22 is a paradigm that War in its military form has prevailed through time as an instrument of Foreign Policy. Clausewitz’s v.24 summarizes that War should be regarded as a political instrument whose purpose is to achieve difficult ends. In light of this definition, it is understood the belligerent actors inside a political framework estimate the use of violence as worthwhile and affordable. Therefore, at least one opponent will be at a disadvantage as the belligerent will wage war on the weaknesses of their targets. But what really drives actors to war is their unchangeable nature. Although the mind prefers clarity and certainty, our nature always finds uncertainty fascinating.  Consequently, the incidence of war is repeatedly happening and intensifying regardless of a Liberal complex world system because state security and defence policies are highly militarized, also understood as a provocation of violence (e.g. US/Russia in missile capability tests 2018) that brings war onto a reality. The remains of Realist influences are yet capable of threatening an ever stronger Liberal Internationalism and international state system of the 21st century, by replicating a pattern of inter-state conflict. The intricacies of war are still violent, and apparently, outbreaks of wars are moved by the same motives of frustration about power and control.

The International Society

One way of explaining the formation of the International Society is by overseeing the participants’ shared conviction of ideologies capable of anticipating issues and planning to mitigate their incurrence. The English School, for instance, is concerned with the normative and behavioural aspects of International Society, explaining the crisis of liberal internationalism is due to the misconduct of some international actors Buzan (2014). A sudden outbreak of an actor’s misconduct will disturb the state system such is the case of Russia/Ukraine causing geo-political destabilization, as well as, isolationism. E.g the reputational damage the Russian foreign policy has earned since its belligerent attempt at Ukraine in 2022, was most clearly reflected in multiple sanctions by the Western bloc. Russia’s relational interactions have been seen to have altered its political behaviour by normalizing its violent appraisal of Ukraine in an attempt to systematize its war policy regardless of its obligations as a state actor including as a member of the SC. 

Naylor’s 2019 view of inter-state behaviour argues that powerful Westernized-type groups are part of a big network of states maintained by their own relational interactions. Whereas ‘status’ at the international level should be understood as a given phenomenon that results from both causal relations and the state’s capabilities difference. The crucial problem is precisely, the motions of exclusion or inclusion of states into these clubs and their consequences, Nylor 2019, or the issue of international membership as explained by Ikenberry 2021. Ukraine might not have been invaded by Russia if its military capability had been in line with the requirements of NATO or the EU system, so there cannot be an interchange of their capacities or interests. Contrarily, wealthy states such as Sweden and Finland, which are not in conflict with the great state of Russia, were quickly incorporated into NATO membership shortly after their application.

This fact proved somehow that the bloc’s strategy as a national strategy is inherently neo-realist and requires the availability of inter-changeable interests to secure peace. Thus, as the membership requirements are unaffordable as in the case of Ukraine, the possibility of violence rises as Ukraine becomes a target. An identifiable framework of crises in International Relations that could be said was instigated at the incident of the Cold War that seems to rule conflicts in the 21st century defined as the struggle for maintaining a balance between network requirements and unilateral cooperation. Thus, international conflict and the incidents of war outsider is an unwanted game they would prefer to stay away from because their membership auspices offer another kind of foreign policy to rely on, however, growing permissible and passive. These observations can lead to two hypothetical theories, one is “The permissibility of state actors and blocs will rely on their own capacity to mitigate risks without compromising security.” Second, “States would prefer to maintain a neutral approach to international conflict in order to securitise their interests under the threat of instigating higher losses, and it is resistant to time whilst increasing tolerance, thus in the end, the incidence of war becomes normalized.” 

Collaborative Interactions

The realization that states can not succeed without securing international peace and order thus, the development of international relations and the recognition of an international society should be seen as a matter of choosing liberal policies. Whereas states needed to understand their pluralism and cooperate as international actors along a shared legal framework, it was achieved not only by raising common views and interests but also by determination and virtuosity, concepts that involve the application of enlightenment values (recognition of human rights, liberal democracy, sovereignty). Although the International Society is inherently elitist, the notions of Western at the core and global at the periphery can be explained as the results of European imperialism, however, this arrangement should not be understood as unalterable on the suzerainty spilling towards a periphery. The International Society functions by group associations as a form of determination and collaborative action is not natural but in line with positivist international law implying a selective identification and the construction of functional networks.  As argued by Buzan, international society is closely associated with positivist law which relates to the law of states and so states rather than of individualism. As peripheral states would replicate grouping selectively in between their geopolitics or interests beyond, it would be not assertive to determine that one world order could ever as a model.

Buzan (2014) argues that international elites should function as the connection between Realism and Cosmopolitanism, to adopt policies with humanitarian elements. This premise can find sustain in the existence of international organisations and projects, including i.e. UN-led Peace Talks that look for dialogue, negotiation and alliances although are sporadic upon the government’s diplomatic predisposition and grand strategies. The international society itself does not secure a system that will protect the interests between the realpolitik and international collaboration, this is more likely to be achieved by a systematized bloc that will meet internationalism and will be oriented to globalization and advantage from the sharing of a common inheritance, historical background, development, language, ethnicity. Hereby, regionalism should be considered as one good alternative to ease down the path to Liberalism.

The incidence of war has proven to be exacerbated precisely when states are not integrated into the stream of international relations, usually transitional isolated democracies or non-members of any state system. E.g. Syria has been living under the scourge of war for such a long time in part because as a country and state are isolated from international politics, their regional state systems are ineffective nor relevant, nor recognise UN covenants and legal institutions. Likewise, Ukraine has spent a long time in the indecisiveness of politics between negotiations to join the European Union and NATO, whilst trying to get rid of the invasion of Russia, in the end, any political advance has been in vain, as it has remained or increased their chances to be attacked by their belligerent actor. Such small mistakes with a powerful negative impact that brings instability to the balance of power, and from where the world should learn its lessons. Therefore this essay proposes the crisis of Liberal Internationalism starts with the observation that it is imperfect as a construct and incomplete as a project and that it needs to be implemented to evolve positivist, pluralist, integrative and diversified. The answer to the liberal internationalism crisis, as suggested by Ikenberry 2020, could be said it be, therefore, more liberal internationalism. 

Conclusions

The incidence of war in the twenty-first century has proven to be a paradox of international relations structures for maintaining peace, as well as, a paradox as the grouping elites and memberships fuel the violent instigation of the attacking party. The warfare support from the partner states (EU countries) to Ukraine could be understood as provoking violence from the belligerent to fuel their militancy. The motion is kept on track as the belligerent raises retaliation and uses abstract tactics such as exhausting the resistance of their targets. As seen, deterrence and intimidation are on a major scale, as humanitarian policies are dismissed by a systematic approach behind the less studied and discussed geopolitics of the powerful. On the other side of the spectrum, in line with the existence of humanitarian politics, an imposition on sovereignty or political submission in the twenty-first century could be seen as absurd. Not even the alleged weakest countries would find surrender a legitimate option. So, when there is not any other choice of foreign policy, the incidence of war becomes the most liked way of maintaining sovereignty, autonomy, power, dominion and legitimate sacrifice.

References:

Buzan, B, 2014: An Introduction to the English School of IR. Cambridge Press. Pp 21-21, 47-60.

Casper, S. 2009. British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress? Manchester University Press. Pp 25-27; 65-67; 

Fratianni, M, & Savona, P 2007, Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution, Taylor & Francis Group, Farnham. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. Pp 171- 174. Ebook ISBN 9780754640462. [29 August 2022].

Goncalves, M, Alves, J, Frota, C, Xia, H, & Arcot, RV 2014, Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets: Prospects for Globalization, Business Expert Press, New York. Pp 1-9. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [29 August 2022]. 

Ikenberry, J. 2020, A world safe for Democracy, Liberal Internationalism, The Crises of Global Order. The University of Virginia Press.  

Leyton. P. 2018, Grand Strategy: The Idea of Grand Strategy, pp. 1-19. E-book available at:

https://www.academia.edu/44830575/Grand_Strategy

[22/08/2022].

Sylvest, C 2009, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?, Manchester University Press, Manchester. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [29 August 2022].

Websites: 

Our World in Data, Military Spending. Available at:

https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending

[22/0/2022]

The Future of the Liberal International Order with J Ikenberry and J Mearsheimer. 2021. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHdE8z_ur6A&list=WL&index=520

[25/08/2000].

Is the State of International Order in the State of Terminal Decline?  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline/

Assessing the UN Effectiveness in Promoting Peace for Syria (2011- 2022).

Assessing the UN Effectiveness in Promoting Peace for Syria (2011- 2022).

Sep 2022

Abstract This writing will analyse the effectiveness of the United Nations in the case of Syria (2011 – 2022). In particular, will focus on Russian participation as a P5 member of the Security Council. To undercover the list of reasons why international intervention has been rendered a failure in the case of the war in Syria a list of relevant factors shall be considered. E.g. The Russian intervention, the US intervention, the development of democracy in Syria, the precedents of the R2P, the new conceptualization of Sovereignty and the insurgency of violence in Syria. Notwithstanding, the intricacies of the systematic dynamics launched by the UN, can be said, to be negatively challenged by Russia’s foreign policy. Arguably, the war scene became ever-complex with the participation of external actors which could have accelerated the alleged decline of UN relevancy. Although called a death lock, the utmost importance of the analysis of this phenomenon relies on the possibility of constituting the basis for future implications and mapping out new strategies. 

Introduction The UN as an international governing and peace agent principally can only pass robust resolutions if they are unanimously agreed upon at the Security Council (SC) level. Whether robust resolutions are believed or not to become the best course of action, how significant and effective can be military intervention against other kinds of non-armed intervention? The process of UN intervention in government states’ conflicts cannot be carried out without prior preparation and consensus to assess its adequacy. The prompt response to conflicts under the Responsibility to Protect robust resolution launched for Libya in 2011 reminded the international of a bitter end to some extent that has undoubtedly affected the UN’s robust decisions as for the case of Syria. Opening the door to the prerogatives of other non-robust mechanisms of peace restoration or unilateral initiatives from part of its Permanent Five members, such as Peace Talks alongside military intervention from the US and Russia to the different poles. In assessing the UN’s performance and effectiveness, therefore, should be considered the level of threat and the UN’s capability as an institution against hegemonic capability and will.  Nevertheless, the acceptance that an international institution has limitations on international governance, the elements that influence the scope of international action rely upon the nature of the politics of the host states and its international performance, elements out of the scope of others. 

Whilst the basis for legitimate international intervention remains contentious the international has to accept no new way or mechanism will exist, however, the course of action needs to be recorded to form the basis of proceedings and estimated outcomes. This essay will analyse the relevant issues that would render the UN effective in its performance towards the Syrian War. 

What went wrong with Syria’s resolutions?  When the war in Syria started as a civil protest in 2011 followed by the news of civilians being punished for public graffiti and for protesting in public, the world knew that the rights of the citizens of Syria were violated by their government state. This was the time when the first UN SC resolution for Syria (04 – Oct – 2011) was drafted condemning these acts that regretfully were affecting already the lives of women and children. The SC also invoked the international society to be vigilant in providing arms and military aid to the Syrian government, as well as, to review for robust resolutions after a lapse of time. Notwithstanding the standards of an effective resolution delivered at the first draft, these remained ineffective in reaching the Syrian government’s consciousness and change of direction if this was what would have been needed to stop a violent response and war escalation. The vetoed resolutions supported by the state of China and, more consistently by the state of Russia, were rooted based on non-interference in a country’s sovereignty (The Westphalian Order) and in the defence to let the Syrian government manage their conflict and build their peace within their ideological views, capacity to decide and operative strategy. Russia’s shielding of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad was continuously at the Security Council level and intensified with their intervention in the war on the ground (2014), becoming the Syrian’s government’s better international advocate. 

So, what went wrong with the Security Council’s effectiveness in issuing an effective Resolution to pacify the violent upsurge in Syria has essentially two branches, the first is related to the demystification of what sovereignty is conceived by some of the Permanent member states such as China. Alongside this shared view with the Russian ideology, it is also found its criticised international politics portrayed as protectionist and adverse the Western liberalism.  The other branch corresponds to elements that are inherent to Middle East countries and their level of democratic processes. They will be discussed as follows. 

Russia’s veto power for the case of Syria.  Russia has vetoed 17 times against SC resolutions on Syria which can be considered as Peters 2009 has argued, an abuse-de-Droit. The Russian performance at the UN Security Council in the R2P consensus for Syria falls in line with the Russian approach to international politics usually adverse to the US influential stance (Ziegler, 2016; Allison, 2013). Russia has anxiety and fears towards Western intervention and regime change (Allison, 2013). Substantiated in incidents of state humanitarian intervention of the past 30-plus years seen as the consequence of the so-called American impetus for imperialism and state vacuum for regime change. Russia often argues the Middle East political instability can be seen as the consequence of the US – Iraq 2003. The reasons why a great state like Russia regards Western-led foreign policies as a threat are debatable. The world has observed how Russia’s foreign moved towards an anti-liberalist stance after the incident of war in Ukraine (March 2022).

Russia’s distrust towards the R2P was based on the idea of being a catalyst for US dominance, which can be said was extremist. For instance, Russia opposed the U.N. Security Council resolution on the 14th Dec 2019. The veto caused the blocking of cross-border aid deliveries equivalent to 12 months of food supply sent from Turkey and Iraq to the millions of Syrian civilians. Russia only agreed to two entries from Turkey and aid deliveries for 6 months instead (Reuters 20/12/2019). In the end, the bigger loss is for the innocent people of Syria whose lives depended upon humanitarian aid and international assistance. 

The Intricacies of Sovereignty and State Intervention.

Sovereignty in its traditional and novel interpretation has been the centre point when discussing Intervention alongside Human Rights which the advocates of peace have tried to conciliate for the last thirty-plus years. Changes in the meaning of Sovereignty started to be encouraged in response to conflicts occurring in many cases in authoritarian regimes i.e The civil war of Afghanistan of 1978/79-1992, and Northern- Iraq in April 1991, where the UN found precedents to legitimise involvement in a state’s internal affairs to alleviate the suffering of Kurd’s ethnicity against S. Hussein. An evolution in the definition of state sovereignty started to be resumed as in the UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar UN General Secretary (1982-1991) last speech on the 31st of December 1991: “Traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty needed to be re-assessed in light of the shift in public attitudes towards the belief  that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal agreement.” Similarly, SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) claimed in the UN Report: An Agenda for Peace, “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, has passed; its theory never matched reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.” More clearly defined by the UN SG Kofi Annan (1997-2006): “Human Rights violations can not overcome the provision of state sovereignty because it is dysfunctional. These claimed Sovereignty should be seen as an instrument to protect populations rather than as a shield for governments to incur in human abuse.” Posteriorly strengthened by UN SG Ban Kin-Moon’s discourse at the Berlin event  (15^th of July 2008): “The R2P is not an adversary of sovereignty but an ally. Strong states will protect their people, the weakest will not, and actually, protection was at the core of the formation of states and Westphalian.” The ground for an adjustment on the definition of what Sovereignty should signify in an ever-growing liberal international world was set. These last statements would have been sufficiently appealing for the UN’s re-interpretation of sovereignty in that it should be seen as a duty of the state rather than a granted value. 

It is not wrong to assume that an expectation of new standards of behaviour was raised after the ICISS Report 2001, mainly aiming at bringing light to the legitimacy of military intervention or action towards human suffering. Intentionally created to appeal to the rise in consciousness about existing definitions and structures of International Relations, Sovereignty, and Human Rights. Moreover, important institutions and non-state actors were created such as the UN High Commission for Human Rights and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, both created in 1993 and its sister tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and Sierra Leone in 2001. The ICISS 2001 report aims at new standards in the new millennium considering the international new tribunals of Human Rights, a higher expectation to prosecute on the grounds of crimes against humanity also raised.

Moreover, Peters: 2009 argued the normative value of sovereignty is derived from and geared towards humanity which is the legal principle of human rights and security. State sovereignty is not merely limited by human rights, but should be seen to exist only in the function of humanity, it has thus been humanized. Stacey 2013, proposes the term ‘relational sovereignty’ –  should be guaranteed in function to its qualitative exercise, as a requirement for its maintenance. State authority could be overwritten by a UN Resolution. For example, International interventions that were not agreed upon and welcomed by their head of state, such as Libya in 2011 intervened by NATO on UN Resolution 1970, 1973. However, it is difficult to conceive other ways of overwriting state authority if it is not by the use of military power. 

The new interpretation of Sovereignty should not only be analyzed against the decision of robust intervention, the prevalence of other kinds of intervention such as unarmed Humanitarian Aid should be protected under this umbrella. The ICISS 2001 report claims the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ does not mean military intervention, because it means many things. Humanitarian intervention refers to many other ways of intervening from diplomacy to humanitarian assistance. The R2P thus can be rendered effective in the way that is protected under the auspices of the UN Charter, which will give careful consideration to many other measures of peacekeeping before considering military deployment.

How effective was the UN Security Council regarding R2P?

The effectiveness of the UN about the Responsibility to Protect first relies on the adherence of the doctrine to ‘other matters’ of the UN Charter in 2005 with the condition upon unanimity of its five permanent members (P5) China, Russia, US, France and the UK. The R2P opened discussion for the legality of international intervention in a state’s sovereignty on the grounds of human atrocities against civilians executed by their head of government e.g. Lybia (2011) and Syria (2011 to date). R2P is meant to deliver a quick military response or bring closer the possibility of military intervention if warning resolutions are not accomplished. For Syria instead, different other unprecedented circumstances made it difficult to use this framework of analysis. As in parallel with the SC consensus meetings, members of the P5 such as Russia in 2014 and the US in 2015 intervened in the Syrian war scene which from a UN administrative perspective this fact could be regarded as an unnecessary complication for peace resolution. 

In December 2019 the world was still witnessing a war intensifying and millions of displaced citizens and the responsibility remains primarily over the P5 members. To approve a resolution at level VII involving the use of military force it is required nine votes from the Security Council and unanimity reached P5. Current international law does not impose an obligation to intervene on individual states. As the right of veto of any P5 member is protected under the UN Charter, there is not an explicit obligation for the SC to reach unanimity on intervention. In this sense, it remains contradictory as vetoing SCRs that would help to halt human rights abuses could be considered a breach of these provisions if no action is taken. 

The UN Peace Talks for Syria (2012- 2022)

One type of mechanism to promote peace is through the UN-led Peace Talks. To be effective, Peace Talks require participation and collaborative action from the parties in conflict. A legitimate instrument looking to instil collaborative dialogue on issues of peace strategy and setting an agenda, the issue was notwithstanding the lack of willingness and openness between the parties involved. In the absence of coercive authority at the international level brokered negotiations can mean long processes. The limited availability and capacity of the Syrian government to truly reconcile its goals with coalition forces was the real barrier. Adding to the lack of inclusion in statebuilding the possibilities for ceasing to fire were constrained.

Meanwhile, the British-based opposition group The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights informed, that the number of deaths reached was 140,000 civilians, and as many as 50,000 people were living in opposition towns, the target of the Syrian military attacks (UN Report 2014). Mr Assad’s officials referred to their unwillingness to negotiate with terrorists and alleged that Syrian officials routinely name terrorists to any opposing entity to the government. A subsequent Peace Talk such as in Vienna, (14 – Nov – 2015) was an international opportunity for political contestation and for reinforcing planning for the Syrian peace reconstruction but was still hindered by the lack of decision on the representative agents. It reunited 20 countries of the International Community with Russia and the US co-chairing the talk given at the level of Foreign Ministers. Theoretically, there were constructive outcomes set out at the meeting, such as the work to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria within six months. Also, the planned schedule for drafting a new constitution and holding a free and fair U.N.-supervised election within 18 months, according to a joint statement released by the United Nations, in 2015. In addition, on December 18th of the same year, the UN Security Council Unanimously Adopted Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing a Road Map for the Peace Process in Syria and setting a Timetable for Talks. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Philip Hammond, emphasized that a national ceasefire must be given in line with the political transition, a process that must involve the departure of President Assad, likewise with the US Secretary J Kerry’s views.It was not yet seven years after, by October 2019, that the formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee could be confirmed. 

Peace Talks for Syria continue although delayed by ideological disagreement and conflicts of interest, the last round dated 15th June 2022. ‘The 18th round of Astana Syria peace talks began in the Kazakh capital amid Turkish threats of intervention against Kurdish forces and a deadlock in previous talks on drafting a constitution.’ Peace Talks for Syria show a slow advance, as the coalition forces, the civil society and the Syrian government meet separately with UN intermediaries to accomplish the initial plan. 

Other causes that constrained the UN’s effectiveness in delivering peace

Although the UN’s administration’s approach to resolving the outbreak of conflict to the war in Syria by discussing the R2P robust dimension was not possible; the war at the scene remains the main impediment in crystalising any sort of UN political effort. The first few years of conflict 2011- 2014 were characterised by the protection that Russia and China brought to the Syrian government with their vetoed resolutions, even on resolutions that required the government not to target civilians and to the non-use of chemical weapons as happened in 2013. The allegations of non-interference in other’s state sovereignty and aversion to the new light on this premise marked by the human massacres of the nineties were not relevant to make the states of China and Russia approve military UN intervention. Sovereignty as highlighted earlier should be conceptualised for the protection of citizens before governments. When this conditionality is broken however R2P concept advocates for the justification for international intervention. When P5 members were not able to compel this new interpretation of sovereignty it converted to the point of discord and the basis of posterior complications. 

The summary of events demonstrates that Russia as an international actor had a unilateral interest as one of the reasons for which exercised their veto power at the UN. A fact that can be interpreted as withdrawing power from the UN as an international institution and relevant to member states. It was not, however, the only way how the UN’s debilitated position in front of delivering peace to the Syrian civilians has lasted. The UN-led Peace Talks could have done little or not much in joining political interests and advancing diplomatic dialogue between the parties in conflicts.

By 2014 the circumstances were different. Russia’s support to the Syrian military and the US’s support to the Kurdish fighters formed a real paradox for the UN. Indeed it is difficult to estimate whether the external actors, members of the P5 could have helped or intensified the course of violence, especially when seeing the devastating consequences lasting to nowadays. The difficult democracy of the Syrian state and its supporters that occupy the state of Syria is a demonstration that there is a path of development on political ideology and democracy, that cannot, however, host every civilian that was born in Syria but that has flown away. In exerting a conclusion on how effective was the UN in aiding peace in Syria, it is, however, a concomitant that would need to base the analysis on the recognition that developing democracies make international intervention almost marginal. This can be denoted as the most important help given in the way how refugees from Syria have been aided and helped elsewhere away from the conflict zone, with UN Human Rights and Refugees agencies put to work. In this way, the UN’s main contribution to the Syrian Peace remains on the support and protection of civilians who flew away.

Thomas Graham 2019, in ‘Let Russia be Russia – Team of Rivals’, argued Russia is highly competitive and wants to become a superpower. Russia can oppose the US, EU and any other Western power because they know they have elements that make it competitive. The fact is that no actor is asking Russia to be less competitive, what it has to do is to compel more often with liberal policies. 

Peace talks are SC initiatives created to establish a relational influence for the mediation of the conflict (Hirblinger, Landau 2020). A process that seems to be simple at first, became complex as the main obstacle is the usual unwillingness to set a dialogue.  In an interview at NBC News on 14/07/2016 Assad’s ‘I want to retake every inch of Syria’ he said at the interview given to. The reports describe Assad supporters as not interested in political debate, being the lack of negotiation that renders peace talks less effective. 

One way to reconcile divisions in fragmented states, as suggested in the Geneva Communique 2012, is by the division of power, and the lawful recognition of coalitions. The UN Resolution 1859 was created in 2015, as an incentive to promote and legally avail of peace solutions for Syria. Thus the Security Council stresses that the principal responsibility for the peaceful settlement of disputes relies on the parties of the conflict and that it is only through their full participation and genuine commitment to resolving the conflict, including the underlying causes, that peace and security can be achieved and sustained. Throughout, the Security Council underlines the importance of building national and local capacity for mediation. The strategy will serve to align these two aspects of brokered negotiations between policy and the peacemaking process. Nevertheless, constrained by the fact that there is indeed a lack of leadership from the Syrian government. Could be deemed that the state’s capacity for negotiation will depend on the Syrian’s resources and their international collaborators, which are unpredictable. It could be perhaps that the Syrian governor is measuring its capacity based on his allies, in this case, Russia, so an estimation of how long Assad will retire from the government will depend on how long more Russia will support the Syrian government, altogether with the other back-supporter states, Iran and Qatar. Nevertheless, Bashar Assad succeeded in the last general election in 2021.  

The time that takes to decide on the best course of action is what makes the difference between success and defeat. In Strategic risk-taken, many options should be considered with the understanding that threats cannot be eliminated but exchanged by other circumstances implying a different but relational risk. If the war in Syria had been resolved at the onset, the problem might not have been the same as it is now but of a different kind, it might or might not be possibly less serious. However, the outcome remains unknown because the course of action was not taken. For instance, whether the operation in Libya in 1973 was a failure, it can be argued that was indeed a success as the threats to civilians disappeared. The Russian allegations of converting Syria into another Libya were portrayed as the worst possible outcome if R2P could have taken place, indeed an even worse outcome happened, an enduring bloody war. Whilst Russia was vetoing Syria resolutions including those claiming transparency in their chemical weapons possession, it was also preparing its military to support Assad’s regime. Thus shall be considered an arbitrary act as pointed out by British Ambassador Matthew Rycroft 2016. Russian behaviour could also be called deceptive. 

On the other hand, what has constrained the UN in adopting bolding approaches to the Syrian war are the convoluted politics of the Syrian government; and the intervention of Russia that ultimately was motivated by the objective of deterring ISIS and Al-Qaeda. However, civilians’ protection was compromised in between militaristic objectives. A war that has taken its course out of bureaucratic discrepancies in taking action against the government of Mr Assad, aided at the SC by the anachronism or narrowness of China and Russia in interpreting state sovereignty. 

What has also constrained the UN at the onset of the war in imposing a resolution to make Assad step out from power has had strong repercussions over the aggravation of the current state of war. If for instance, this imposition could have been effective, the coalition forces would have convened earlier in the process of political transition as it was only a year after the war outbreak that the Peace Talk Geneva 2012.  The Geneva Communique called for the reconstruction of peace and order that would have resolved political limitations in favour of the coalition forces, leading to state reconstruction and a new President. However, it will remain uncertain if the re-insurgency of ISIS would have happened. 

Finally, what has constrained the U.N. in resolving the war in Syria are external forces to their scope. The U.N. is an international organism and not supranational, it does not hold authority over other states. It could be useful to mind-bearing that Syria has not committed to the Rule of Law or the Rome Statute, therefore, their justice politics and home affairs can difficulty be regulated. Notwithstanding, the UN made available advisory groups to developing democracies and supports political transition projects as shown through the security Peace Talks in Geneva, as well as in other interim motions. I.e. Pedersen reported in January 2020, that the accession of the Syrian Foreign Minister to the Political transition led by the UN, means perhaps that a door for political contestation and agency is being opened, accounting for a positive and effective UN-led political process. It could also mean that finally, Syrian politics are ready to open to the developments of the world of modern states of the 21^st Century. 

Conclusion

The interventionist aspect of the UN as the R2P is still contested and disbelieved by states such as Russia, which was noted in the various vetoed resolutions in the case of Syria (2012-2022) limiting global governance and the UN’s intention for remaining relevant and effective in securing a path to conflict’s resolution. Meanwhile, the ideological differences in the international arena in balancing sovereignty against human rights and focussing on the protection of civilians rather than on governments are still inadequate for the moving-on world of this century. The most radical differences in ideologies exist between international states and systems, there will be continuity for robust responses to take place.

Peace Talks initiatives could be seen as a way to level these states’ ideological differences, but in a fragmented country that cannot reconcile its poles onto common security objectives, it will be difficult to take control of their military strategies and forces. The difficulty of trying to pacify a conflictive state is exacerbated by the inadequacy of anti-liberal governments in an ever-growing standardising population mind frame that might already think of sovereignty as a concept that embraces factions of human rights, expanding independently of states’ boundaries.

References:

Fratianni, M, & Savona, P 2007, Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution, Taylor & Francis Group, Farnham. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. Pp 171- 174. Ebook ISBN 9780754640462. [29 August 2022].

Ikenberry, J. 2020, A world safe for Democracy, Liberal Internationalism, The Crises of Global Order. The University of Virginia Press.  

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https://www.academia.edu/44830575/Grand_Strategy

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Franceschet, A. (2002). The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: From International to Global Governing Institutions. In: Kant and Liberal Internationalism. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-07853-7_6

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Peter, Anne, 2009. Humanity, the Alpha and Omega. The European Journal of International Law Vol. 20 no. 3 EJIL (2009), Vol. 20 No. 3, 513–544. 

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Political and Peace-building Affairs. Available at: http://dppa.un.org/en/mission/special-envoy-syria

See also: https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm

Steward, M Patrick, Director of Int. Institution of Global Governance, CFR, on UN SC reform. https://www.cfr.org/expert/stewart-m-patrick

Kikkawa Gen, “Conflict Prevention and Democratic Peace,” in Masashi Sekiguchi (ed), Government and Politics Vol. II,” (EOLSS UNESCO, 2009), p. 297 – Also available on: link

 Russia casts 10th U.N. veto on Syria action, blocking inquiry renewal (2023). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons-idUSKBN1DG31I 

(Accessed: 27 February 2023)

Buzan Barry, 2008. People, States and Fear: And Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era. International Relations Magazine. UAM-GERI Vol. 9. 

Assessing the trajectory of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, it found that his speech on sovereignty in December 1991, A Call for Changes after Conflicts over the 1980s-1991. Link

Opening Statement to the Constitutional Committee by Geir O. Pedersen, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, 30 October 2019. Available at: www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E

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What is differentiated integration and how does it operate?

Discussion with reference to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

by Ka_2016

Within the study of the integration of the European Union, ‘differentiated integration’ is called to the dynamics and stages that government states adopt in order to integrate together for the coordination in different aspects of public policies. This intergovernmental cooperation aims to establish international regulations that will transcend national boundaries. 

One of the ways to understand what is differentiated integration and how this operates is through the understanding that will make the government pursue communitary policies and regulations in issues such as migration and security. However the more factual way to understand differentiated integration is through the knowledge of how this operates. The categorisation of differentiated integration types such as multi-speed, variable geometry and a la carte are almost enough to explain how homogenisation of differences can occur within the processes of the EU system.

Differentiated integration conceived within the matters of Justice and Home Affairs, as many academic texts refer, is overtly underpinned by the pressures of the creation of the Single Market completed by 1986. Essentially, the policies referring to the integration in economic and commercial integration, were demanding more cooperation in the free movement of people at EU level. However, migration, asylum and judicial cooperation were traditionally linked to sovereignty and state welfare, for which intergovernmental cooperation was primarily essential to achieve further developments in this area.

JHA as the pillar created to encapsulate these matters, consolidated at the Treaty of Maastricht 1992 (also known as the Treaty of the EU), made an important difference of principally migration and security policies by creating institutionalisation of separate pillars. Further developed in the Amsterdam Treaty 1997, with the creation of the Area of Freedom of Security and Justice AFSJ. However, at the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), great changes that affected the organisation of JHA were introduced such as the system of Qualified Majority of Votes (QMV) into various areas of migration and asylum policies.

This essay will explain differentiated integration by analysing key examples of the Justice and Home Affairs, its evolution along the system and how this operates.

Background

Differentiated integration, though as a process, is not a new phenomenon but it has been integral to the formation of the EU since the Treaty of Rome (1960s). In the development of the European system, since the formation of the ECSC (1951), it could be said that states have integrated differently and provided different arrangements reflected on international treaties and agreements.

In the study of the European System,  treaties are lawful constitutions  that member states must abide,

decided by political discussion and cooperation of its parties.  One complication of treaties as described by some academics, is the intention to homogenize not only policies but ideals, objectives and functions that could impinge directly into sovereignty and national welfare.

The area of Justice and Home Affairs was created at the treaty of Maastricht 1992,  with the intention to institutionalise cooperation in dealing with sensitive matters of community policy by intergovernmental cooperation separated from the EU authority (EU Parliament, and the EU Council principally).

JHA encapsulate efforts to develop cooperation in issues of  international crime and terrorism, to manage immigration, and to improve security and the protection of rights through police and judicial coordination.  This process will imply a multi level of political agreements, dynamics, methods, and flexibility. On the other hand, JHA coordination has developed throughout the set of treaties, from an intergovernmental approach to the communitarisation of policies. The Treaty of Maastricht also called Treaty of the European Union (TEC) 1992, enacted in 1993, set the basis as a system of pillars. Reached definition at the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, enacted by 1999. Later re-structured in the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, which is the most current at the present, and preceded the important Treaty of Stockholm (2009). This last provide of European plans for further communitarisation of policies in the EU in a time lapse of 5 years.

Moreover, the area of JHA has managed to integrate together all issues revolving around migration, such as asylum, judicial cooperation and criminal justice such as Europol and control of borders. One of the JHA imbalances, however, are the dilemma of the prisons, whilst trying to balance human rights and national capacity and interest.

The Big Picture

One way to explain  what is differentiated integration is through the study of the factors that make governments pursue international policies, being the single market project of the 1980s, a great influence.

The pressure to achieve coordination on the free movement of people was aligned in order to progress with goals for achieving greater economic and market cooperation. At the same time, it created a new market for regulation that will have a different approach to EU policy making and a different perspective to integrate in this area.

The integration of the European Union, TEU 1992, has worked almost in a non problematic way in areas concerning the integration of the single market 1980s and the creation of the European Monetary Union, which dynamic can be explained in neo-functionalist terms and in the ‘Spillover’ process. However, in sensitive matters such as JHA the consideration of national autonomy becomes highlighted, principally for impinging directly into national welfare. The Spillover dynamic was actually not expected to favour integration in this area. So, there was a clear need for setting a new approach to deal with the matters that comprehend JHA. 

One of the limitations that this area had to succeed was the unanimity requirement that migration policies had to achieve in intergovernmental conferences (Maastricht). However with the Qualified Majority of Votes (QMV) system initiated at the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which was leaving out of concern for unanimous decision in most of the areas of migration policies and only requiring unanimity in some of them, favoured the flexibility in the integration process.

Furthermore, changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty 2007, contributed to the flexibility for QMV to affect various areas of migration policies. As a result, the Commission started to take a leading role in the development and proposal of policies in JHA matters. In an attempt to gain control over the majority of  areas of EU policies, the EU Commission has underpinned the almost total communitarization of the EU system. This development implied arduous intergovernmental conferences, implementing and extending capacities of its administrative organisation, as well as promoted to the institutionalisation  of the EU structure. Indeed the changes that supported the QMV system empowered the Commission and the EU authority, which suggest that a stronger capacity to coordinate and formulate policies at EU level, was based on the international approach, rather than at national levels.

As the Majone’s explanation states, once the single market program underpinned the pressure for further integration in special areas as migration, the need to overcome negative externalities becomes vital. The difficulties faced by states in dealing with the changes of Third National Countries (TNC), or control of external borders, can actually be succeeded at national level. However, it would be even more desirable to ease the collision of policies in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Therefore, the institutionalization and cooperation that sustains JHA is based on the positive returns of delegating authorities to Supranational levels. Intergovernmental cooperation needs for instance a specialized institution that would positively affect in reducing costs of  transaction and make efficient use in the management of information, to avoid  what Majone called ‘intergovernmental failure’.

Therefore, in an arena where the cost of benefiting from a European unified market was achieving coordination in sensitive matters of national autonomy, concerns lead government states to become more flexible in this regard. As less autonomous decisions were required with new laws enacted from the treaties, the dynamic of EU policy making became more viable and developed through these advancements. A clear growing acceptability by member states to transfer powers to supranational units in a new flexible arena was envisaged. In consequence, the policy making processes became flexible and reciprocal between intergovernmental cooperation and supranational operations, which favoured the deepening of integration of the European Union, as a progressive standardised unit.

Moreover, the understanding of the Spillover process as changes in one area will instigate changes in related areas, will explain how the process of integration and regulation of policies in the European Union will accomplish a cycle of completion. The process to approach JHA policies differently from all other policies of EU concern, in the believe that Spillover won’t explain neither work out for integration, could be proved wrong.Through time the communitarisation of EU policies in JHA matters, are somehow demonstrating Spillover can explain integration after the initial phase of communitarisation. Due to the different categorisations available to member states to integrate their policies, or develop policies within given frameworks in the EU, it is shown that Spillover can make sense.  For instance the special relation between the UK and Ireland, both characterised to have the strongest border controls in the EU with capacity to opt-out of matters of JHA, underpinned in the Treaty of Amsterdam (Journal of the Common Market Studies, Vol 37, Pg5). Some observations that would explain the process of Spillover in this area are indeed effective. Both countries are joined by a system of inclusion of passports, together with the concerns of Northern- Ireland, this would explain why they both coordinate operations of EU integration and opt – outs powers obtained at the Lisbon agreement. Opt- out on measures concerning the exchange of police information and evaluation of JHA policies.

To conclude, the factors that will explain why governments are willing to pursue or veto policies of cooperation in JHA are the main driving element for accomplishing further integration. The explanation can be given in a very logical way simply by overlooking the inherited factors behind.

2.The Methodical Approach

The other more factual way of explaining differentiated integration is through the differentiation of its categories.

The diverse factors that have shaped the dynamics of European Integration and pushed intergovernmental decisions into a qualitative change for supranational authority, has led to the development of categories of differentiated integration (DI).  This attempt to explain how DI works within a given framework that must be designed within the European Union system. The most important categorisations are, multi-speed integration, variable geometry and ‘a la carte’. These categories differ in substance of time, space and geometry respectively (Stubb,1996).

Multi speed – time integration is when all member states accept to pursue the same policies but at different times. The core of more structuralized members will pursue policies providing that other states will have a time lapse in which they will adjust as necessary in order to accomplish the same goals. This is suitable for introducing new policies, providing the original actis communautaire of the EU will remain the same, member states are given a time for making the necessary flanking measures to achieve the same goals. For instance, at the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), further changes in the pillar system were institutionalised in regards to Title IV TEC of the EU system which led to adjustments to establish the Area of Foreign and Security Justice. This regards a mixture of  policies in JHA entering into the community council sphere as asylum, and others remaining of intergovernmental bargaining such as in judicial and police cooperation. States were given a time lapse of five years to achieve a completion on the requirements of standardisation, which constitutes a good example of multi-speed integration.

The other method that explains the actual operations of DI is called ‘variable geometry’. This considers European geopolitics as separated by space, then by time, and has advanced further the institutionalization to homogenize diversity. The differences of culture, economic and government bureaucracy are taken into account as constraints in achieving communitarisation in the EU. The goals set in this framework will vary for each of the member states.

A good example is the Schengen agreement signed in 1985, allowing a group of community states to speed up integration by eliminating the barriers for free movement of people and improve the control of borders into the Schengen community, including sharing a common database system.  Originally conformed by the Benelux countries, France and West Germany. From an outsider point of view,  Schengen is a model or variable geometry as non-EU members’ neighbours are affected by the policies of control of borders and regulations. So, Schengen can actually include non – EU members such as Norway, Iceland and  Switzerland.

Under the same perspective, UK and Ireland, both providing commonalities of cultural heritage, and geo-politics, opted- out from some of the clauses of the Schengen Area in regards of border controls and visa sections, but remain compelled by Schengen actis in the rest of all matters such as asylum and police cooperation. The actis communautaire introduced in the EU law at the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, overlapping some the Schengen agreements, is at the same time sustained on its own basis. So, countries leaving the EU can still be part of Schengen and its requirements, such as the UK (June 2016).

In conclusion, the Schengen agreement acted as an important tool to accelerate integration that positively affected the EU system integration in sensitive matters as of JHA.  Bringing flexibility of memberships to members and non- member of the EU.

Finally, A la carte integration,applied for less communitarised goals as this method works better for very specific policies. Member states after stepping into a minimum level of integration, they can choose to go for deepening integration by a la carte or multi speed integration. The main characteristic here is that the integration is based on matter.

3. Further developments

The Asylum System developments from the Tampere (1999) to Stockholm Program (2009 – 2014). The issuing of asylum admissions has been increased, due to the increase in demand. The awakening of new democracies, political refugees, and civil wars in the Middle East countries, are factors that have determined the number of people applying for asylum visas. The Dublin agreement, 2003, aimed to regulate the application of asylum seekers, whose implementation must apply to the country of first point of entry. Subsequently detailed by The Hague, in 2004, which brought the EU with a sense of humanistic consideration for asylum seekers in ways to integrate better immigration communities. Integrated at the Lisbon Treaty as for concern of the EU (JHA).

The problem of international organised crime seemed to rise in the 1990s with the demise of communist countries. The terrorist attacks of September 2001, was also a factor that appealed to strict control of borders. Europol, created in 1999, in the post-Maastricht, has functioned in policing operations within the EU, with exception of the UK and Ireland. Developed into Police and Judicial Cooperation areas, aimed to tackle organised crime, security and migration within the EU. Created agencies of intelligence and networks, European Judicial Network, designed to improve cooperation between its member states. Demonstrating that developments to integrate all kinds of issues in JHA, has been a process that has proved successful. As the only way to ensure great control and security of borders and crime.

Conclusion

The integration of the EU has been a gradual process that is ever changing, as the developments and modifications belong rather to the variables of external factors. The EU has developed JHA matters through the modification and implementation of the EU Treaties, and has proved to achieve certain stability and convert the demands for policy regulations. JHA, it is integrating and expanding its capacity to tackle as possible all issues in one only organism, which aim to be cost effective. Lastly, the methods of integration, if not difficult to define and describe, are flexible in many regards which helps to a positive integration of policies and communitarisation of functions at EU levels.

References

European Union Politics, 2011, (John McCormick).

Stetter, Stephan. 2000. Regulating migration: authority delegation in justice and home affairs. Journal of European Public Policy 7 (1):80-103.

Monar, Jörg. 2001. The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs. Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (4):747-764.

Nieman, Arne. 2012. The dynamics of EU migration policy: from Maastricht to Lisbon. In Constructing a policy-making state? Policy dynamics in the European Union, edited by J. Richardson, pp. 209-33. Oxford: Oxford U.P.

Hinarejos, Alicia, J.R. Spencer, and Steve Peers. 2012. Opting out of EU Criminal Law: What is actually involved?, CELS Working Paper, New Series, No.1. Cambridge: University of Cambridge/Centre for European Legal Studies.

Stubb, A. C.-G. 1996. A Categorization of Differentiated Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (2):283–95.

Lavenex, S. and Wallace, W. (2010) ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, H. Wallace M. Pollack and A. Young (eds) Policy Making in the European Union, 6th edition (Oxford: OUP): 458-77.

What is differentiated integration and how does it operate?

Discussion with reference to Justice and Home Affairs.

Within the study of the integration of the European Union, ‘differentiated integration’ is called to the dynamics and stages that government states adopt in order to integrate together for the coordination in different aspects of public policies. This intergovernmental cooperation aims to establish international regulations that will transcend national boundaries. 

One of the ways to understand what is differentiated integration and how this operates is through the understanding that will make the government pursue communitary policies and regulations in issues such as migration and security. However the more factual way to understand differentiated integration is through the knowledge of how this operates. The categorisation of differentiated integration types such as multi-speed, variable geometry and a la carte are almost enough to explain how homogenisation of differences can occur within the processes of the EU system.

Differentiated integration conceived within the matters of Justice and Home Affairs, as many academic texts refer, is overtly underpinned by the pressures of the creation of the Single Market completed by 1986. Essentially, the policies referring to the integration in economic and commercial integration, were demanding more cooperation in the free movement of people at EU level. However, migration, asylum and judicial cooperation were traditionally linked to sovereignty and state welfare, for which intergovernmental cooperation was primarily essential to achieve further developments in this area.

JHA as the pillar created to encapsulate these matters, consolidated at the Treaty of Maastricht 1992 (also known as the Treaty of the EU), made an important difference of principally migration and security policies by creating institutionalisation of separate pillars. Further developed in the Amsterdam Treaty 1997, with the creation of the Area of Freedom of Security and Justice AFSJ. However, at the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), great changes that affected the organisation of JHA were introduced such as the system of Qualified Majority of Votes (QMV) into various areas of migration and asylum policies.

This essay will explain differentiated integration by analysing key examples of the Justice and Home Affairs, its evolution along the system and how this operates.

Background

Differentiated integration, though as a process, is not a new phenomenon but it has been integral to the formation of the EU since the Treaty of Rome (1960s). In the development of the European system, since the formation of the ECSC (1951), it could be said that states have integrated differently and provided different arrangements reflected on international treaties and agreements.

In the study of the European System,  treaties are lawful constitutions  that member states must abide,

decided by political discussion and cooperation of its parties.  One complication of treaties as described by some academics, is the intention to homogenize not only policies but ideals, objectives and functions that could impinge directly into sovereignty and national welfare.

The area of Justice and Home Affairs was created at the treaty of Maastricht 1992,  with the intention to institutionalise cooperation in dealing with sensitive matters of community policy by intergovernmental cooperation separated from the EU authority (EU Parliament, and the EU Council principally).

JHA encapsulate efforts to develop cooperation in issues of  international crime and terrorism, to manage immigration, and to improve security and the protection of rights through police and judicial coordination.  This process will imply a multi level of political agreements, dynamics, methods, and flexibility. On the other hand, JHA coordination has developed throughout the set of treaties, from an intergovernmental approach to the communitarisation of policies. The Treaty of Maastricht also called Treaty of the European Union (TEC) 1992, enacted in 1993, set the basis as a system of pillars. Reached definition at the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, enacted by 1999. Later re-structured in the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, which is the most current at the present, and preceded the important Treaty of Stockholm (2009). This last provide of European plans for further communitarisation of policies in the EU in a time lapse of 5 years.

Moreover, the area of JHA has managed to integrate together all issues revolving around migration, such as asylum, judicial cooperation and criminal justice such as Europol and control of borders. One of the JHA imbalances, however, are the dilemma of the prisons, whilst trying to balance human rights and national capacity and interest.

1. The Big Picture

One way to explain  what is differentiated integration is through the study of the factors that make governments pursue international policies, being the single market project of the 1980s, a great influence.

The pressure to achieve coordination on the free movement of people was aligned in order to progress with goals for achieving greater economic and market cooperation. At the same time, it created a new market for regulation that will have a different approach to EU policy making and a different perspective to integrate in this area.

The integration of the European Union, TEU 1992, has worked almost in a non problematic way in areas concerning the integration of the single market 1980s and the creation of the European Monetary Union, which dynamic can be explained in neo-functionalist terms and in the ‘Spillover’ process. However, in sensitive matters such as JHA the consideration of national autonomy becomes highlighted, principally for impinging directly into national welfare. The Spillover dynamic was actually not expected to favour integration in this area. So, there was a clear need for setting a new approach to deal with the matters that comprehend JHA. 

One of the limitations that this area had to succeed was the unanimity requirement that migration policies had to achieve in intergovernmental conferences (Maastricht). However with the Qualified Majority of Votes (QMV) system initiated at the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which was leaving out of concern for unanimous decision in most of the areas of migration policies and only requiring unanimity in some of them, favoured the flexibility in the integration process.

Furthermore, changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty 2007, contributed to the flexibility for QMV to affect various areas of migration policies. As a result, the Commission started to take a leading role in the development and proposal of policies in JHA matters. In an attempt to gain control over the majority of  areas of EU policies, the EU Commission has underpinned the almost total communitarization of the EU system. This development implied arduous intergovernmental conferences, implementing and extending capacities of its administrative organisation, as well as promoted to the institutionalisation  of the EU structure. Indeed the changes that supported the QMV system empowered the Commission and the EU authority, which suggest that a stronger capacity to coordinate and formulate policies at EU level, was based on the international approach, rather than at national levels.

As the Majone’s explanation states, once the single market program underpinned the pressure for further integration in special areas as migration, the need to overcome negative externalities becomes vital. The difficulties faced by states in dealing with the changes of Third National Countries (TNC), or control of external borders, can actually be succeeded at national level. However, it would be even more desirable to ease the collision of policies in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Therefore, the institutionalization and cooperation that sustains JHA is based on the positive returns of delegating authorities to Supranational levels. Intergovernmental cooperation needs for instance a specialized institution that would positively affect in reducing costs of  transaction and make efficient use in the management of information, to avoid  what Majone called ‘intergovernmental failure’.

Therefore, in an arena where the cost of benefiting from a European unified market was achieving coordination in sensitive matters of national autonomy, concerns lead government states to become more flexible in this regard. As less autonomous decisions were required with new laws enacted from the treaties, the dynamic of EU policy making became more viable and developed through these advancements. A clear growing acceptability by member states to transfer powers to supranational units in a new flexible arena was envisaged. In consequence, the policy making processes became flexible and reciprocal between intergovernmental cooperation and supranational operations, which favoured the deepening of integration of the European Union, as a progressive standardised unit.

Moreover, the understanding of the Spillover process as changes in one area will instigate changes in related areas, will explain how the process of integration and regulation of policies in the European Union will accomplish a cycle of completion. The process to approach JHA policies differently from all other policies of EU concern, in the believe that Spillover won’t explain neither work out for integration, could be proved wrong.Through time the communitarisation of EU policies in JHA matters, are somehow demonstrating Spillover can explain integration after the initial phase of communitarisation. Due to the different categorisations available to member states to integrate their policies, or develop policies within given frameworks in the EU, it is shown that Spillover can make sense.  For instance the special relation between the UK and Ireland, both characterised to have the strongest border controls in the EU with capacity to opt-out of matters of JHA, underpinned in the Treaty of Amsterdam (Journal of the Common Market Studies, Vol 37, Pg5). Some observations that would explain the process of Spillover in this area are indeed effective. Both countries are joined by a system of inclusion of passports, together with the concerns of Northern- Ireland, this would explain why they both coordinate operations of EU integration and opt – outs powers obtained at the Lisbon agreement. Opt- out on measures concerning the exchange of police information and evaluation of JHA policies.

To conclude, the factors that will explain why governments are willing to pursue or veto policies of cooperation in JHA are the main driving element for accomplishing further integration. The explanation can be given in a very logical way simply by overlooking the inherited factors behind.

2.The Methodical Approach

The other more factual way of explaining differentiated integration is through the differentiation of its categories.

The diverse factors that have shaped the dynamics of European Integration and pushed intergovernmental decisions into a qualitative change for supranational authority, has led to the development of categories of differentiated integration (DI).  This attempt to explain how DI works within a given framework that must be designed within the European Union system. The most important categorisations are, multi-speed integration, variable geometry and ‘a la carte’. These categories differ in substance of time, space and geometry respectively (Stubb,1996).

Multi speed – time integration is when all member states accept to pursue the same policies but at different times. The core of more structuralized members will pursue policies providing that other states will have a time lapse in which they will adjust as necessary in order to accomplish the same goals. This is suitable for introducing new policies, providing the original actis communautaire of the EU will remain the same, member states are given a time for making the necessary flanking measures to achieve the same goals. For instance, at the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), further changes in the pillar system were institutionalised in regards to Title IV TEC of the EU system which led to adjustments to establish the Area of Foreign and Security Justice. This regards a mixture of  policies in JHA entering into the community council sphere as asylum, and others remaining of intergovernmental bargaining such as in judicial and police cooperation. States were given a time lapse of five years to achieve a completion on the requirements of standardisation, which constitutes a good example of multi-speed integration.

The other method that explains the actual operations of DI is called ‘variable geometry’. This considers European geopolitics as separated by space, then by time, and has advanced further the institutionalization to homogenize diversity. The differences of culture, economic and government bureaucracy are taken into account as constraints in achieving communitarisation in the EU. The goals set in this framework will vary for each of the member states.

A good example is the Schengen agreement signed in 1985, allowing a group of community states to speed up integration by eliminating the barriers for free movement of people and improve the control of borders into the Schengen community, including sharing a common database system.  Originally conformed by the Benelux countries, France and West Germany. From an outsider point of view,  Schengen is a model or variable geometry as non-EU members’ neighbours are affected by the policies of control of borders and regulations. So, Schengen can actually include non – EU members such as Norway, Iceland and  Switzerland.

Under the same perspective, UK and Ireland, both providing commonalities of cultural heritage, and geo-politics, opted- out from some of the clauses of the Schengen Area in regards of border controls and visa sections, but remain compelled by Schengen actis in the rest of all matters such as asylum and police cooperation. The actis communautaire introduced in the EU law at the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, overlapping some the Schengen agreements, is at the same time sustained on its own basis. So, countries leaving the EU can still be part of Schengen and its requirements, such as the UK (June 2016).

In conclusion, the Schengen agreement acted as an important tool to accelerate integration that positively affected the EU system integration in sensitive matters as of JHA.  Bringing flexibility of memberships to members and non- member of the EU.

Finally, A la carte integration,applied for less communitarised goals as this method works better for very specific policies. Member states after stepping into a minimum level of integration, they can choose to go for deepening integration by a la carte or multi speed integration. The main characteristic here is that the integration is based on matter.

3. Further developments

The Asylum System developments from the Tampere (1999) to Stockholm Program (2009 – 2014). The issuing of asylum admissions has been increased, due to the increase in demand. The awakening of new democracies, political refugees, and civil wars in the Middle East countries, are factors that have determined the number of people applying for asylum visas. The Dublin agreement, 2003, aimed to regulate the application of asylum seekers, whose implementation must apply to the country of first point of entry. Subsequently detailed by The Hague, in 2004, which brought the EU with a sense of humanistic consideration for asylum seekers in ways to integrate better immigration communities. Integrated at the Lisbon Treaty as for concern of the EU (JHA).

The problem of international organised crime seemed to rise in the 1990s with the demise of communist countries. The terrorist attacks of September 2001, was also a factor that appealed to strict control of borders. Europol, created in 1999, in the post-Maastricht, has functioned in policing operations within the EU, with exception of the UK and Ireland. Developed into Police and Judicial Cooperation areas, aimed to tackle organised crime, security and migration within the EU. Created agencies of intelligence and networks, European Judicial Network, designed to improve cooperation between its member states. Demonstrating that developments to integrate all kinds of issues in JHA, has been a process that has proved successful. As the only way to ensure great control and security of borders and crime.

Conclusion

The integration of the EU has been a gradual process that is ever changing, as the developments and modifications belong rather to the variables of external factors. The EU has developed JHA matters through the modification and implementation of the EU Treaties, and has proved to achieve certain stability and convert the demands for policy regulations. JHA, it is integrating and expanding its capacity to tackle as possible all issues in one only organism, which aim to be cost effective. Lastly, the methods of integration, if not difficult to define and describe, are flexible in many regards which helps to a positive integration of policies and communitarisation of functions at EU levels.

References

European Union Politics, 2011, (John McCormick).

Stetter, Stephan. 2000. Regulating migration: authority delegation in justice and home affairs. Journal of European Public Policy 7 (1):80-103.

Monar, Jörg. 2001. The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs. Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (4):747-764.

Nieman, Arne. 2012. The dynamics of EU migration policy: from Maastricht to Lisbon. In Constructing a policy-making state? Policy dynamics in the European Union, edited by J. Richardson, pp. 209-33. Oxford: Oxford U.P.

Hinarejos, Alicia, J.R. Spencer, and Steve Peers. 2012. Opting out of EU Criminal Law: What is actually involved?, CELS Working Paper, New Series, No.1. Cambridge: University of Cambridge/Centre for European Legal Studies.

Stubb, A. C.-G. 1996. A Categorization of Differentiated Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (2):283–95.

Lavenex, S. and Wallace, W. (2010) ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, H. Wallace M. Pollack and A. Young (eds) Policy Making in the European Union, 6th edition (Oxford: OUP): 458-77.

Dissertation first draft